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WHY DO INCUMBENTS RESPOND HETEROGENEOUSLY TO DISRUPTIVE 




We adopt a multifaceted view of organizational identity to contribute to research on organizational 
identity and incumbent adaptations to disruptive innovations. Based on a qualitative, multi-case study 
on the responses of German publishing houses to the emergence of digitalization, we distill a novel and 
thus far disregarded facet of organizational identity: organizational role identity. We show how 
organizational role identity and organizational domain identity—the facet that has so far dominated 
research on identity and innovation—interactively determine how organizations interpret and respond 
to a disruptive innovation. In contrast to previous studies, we show that incumbents experience 
dysfunctional identity-driven struggles when one of the two identity facets is challenged by the 
disruptive innovation while the other is enhanced. We also induce that domain and role identities can 
jointly determine how quickly incumbents react to a disruption, whether they adopt that disruption, and 
the innovativeness of their responses.  
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One of the most critical challenges for established companies is making sense of and responding to 
disruptive innovations—i.e., new ways of creating and capturing value that dramatically deviate from 
the traditional innovation trajectory and are inherently financially unappealing to incumbents (Ansari, 
Garud, and Kumaraswamy, 2016; Christensen and Bower, 1996; Klenner, Hüsig, and Dowling, 2013; 
Yu and Hang, 2010). In fact, many previous market leaders have lost their competitive dominance 
when disruptive innovations, such as digital photography (Benner, 2010), online news (Gilbert, 2005), 
and online music-distribution systems (Ansari and Krop, 2012), emerged. Given these ramifications, a 
wide stream of research has explored how organizational decision makers make sense of and adapt to 
disruptive innovations (for summaries, see Ansari and Krop, 2012; Eggers and Park, 2018; Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003).  
Within this research stream, a new conversation has emerged, which suggests that studies of the 
dynamics between organizational identity and innovation might be particularly suitable for developing 
a more accurate portrayal of the challenges involved in adapting to disruptive innovation (Altman and 
Tripsas, 2015; Anthony and Tripsas, 2016; Garud and Karunakaran, 2017; Livengood and Reger, 2010; 
Tripsas, 2009). According to Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, and Corley (2013b, p. 125), 
“[o]rganizational identity represents those features of an organization that in the eyes of its members 
are central to the organization’s character or ‘self-image,’ make the organization distinctive from other 
similar organizations, and are viewed as having continuity over time.” In other words, “organizational 
identity” refers to members’ situated perceptions of who we are as an organization (Albert and 
Whetten, 1985). Such perceptions establish a cognitive “lens that provides a basis for sense-making” 
(Cornelissen, Haslam, and Balmer, 2007, p. 9; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and Thomas, 1996) 
and are, therefore, likely to influence how firm members attend to, interpret, and respond to changes 
(Livengood and Reger, 2010). Perceptions of organizational identity are particularly salient and 
influential when external events require organizations to make fundamental changes (Ashford, Lee, and 
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Bobko, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Nag, Corley, and Gioia, 2007), which is the case with 
disruptive innovations (Danneels, 2007).  
The recent studies on organizational identity and innovation promise a new perspective on one of 
the focal questions in the conversation on disruptive innovation: Why do relatively homogeneous 
incumbents within an industry respond heterogeneously to the same disruption (Livengood and Reger, 
2010; Tripsas, 2013)? Most importantly, response heterogeneity might be explained by the fact that the 
decision makers in some firms perceive a given disruptive innovation as enhancing their organization’s 
identity, while decision makers in other firms perceive the same innovation as threatening or 
challenging their organization’s identity (Anthony and Tripsas, 2016). Additionally, firms might differ 
in how their members align identity perceptions and innovative activities (Anthony and Tripsas, 2016; 
Garud and Karunakaran, 2017). 
Despite these important advances, critical conceptual and empirical gaps remain in our 
understanding of the role of organizational identity in incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations. 
Most importantly, as noted by Anthony and Tripsas (2016), the extant literature almost exclusively 
adopts a sociological or institutional view of organizational identity (Navis and Glynn, 2010; Watkiss 
and Glynn, 2016). This perspective envisions organizational identity as enacted through claims of 
membership in a specific category, or domain, of organizations, especially claims about “which group 
of organizations we belong to” and “what is our competitive home turf” (Porac, Thomas, and 
Baden‐Fuller, 1989). However, this view disregards that organizational identity is a multifaceted 
construct, which is construed through many other attributes than merely membership in a certain 
domain (Gustafson, 1995). For instance, perceptions of organizational identity also include claims 
about “why and how we do what we do” and “how we relate to others” (Gustafson and Reger, 1995). 
Acknowledging the multifaceted character of organizational identity is of vital importance. Prior 
accounts (e.g., Gilbert, 2005) indicate, at least implicitly, that disruptive innovations might challenge 
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facets of organizational identity beyond identity claims related to firms’ membership in certain 
competitive groups or industries. However, we lack a clear understanding of which other facets are 
challenged by disruptions and how. Moreover, the extant research does not address how these different 
identity challenges could affect incumbent responses to disruptive innovation (Ashforth and Mael, 
1996; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). In short, identity challenges and innovation-identity realignment 
processes might be substantially more complex and multilayered than described thus far, which 
motivated us to investigate two crucial research questions: First, which facets of organizational identity 
other than perceptions of the organization’s membership categories surface when members attend to 
and interpret a disruptive innovation? Second, how and why does the way in which members perceive 
the various facets of their identities as challenged or enhanced by a disruptive innovation trigger inter-
firm differences in organizational adaptation to that innovation? 
Given the open character of our research questions and the fact that we searched for 
heterogeneity in organizational response behaviors, we adopted a theory-informed, inductive, 
longitudinal, multiple-case research strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Yin, 1994). 
More specifically, we conducted a longitudinal analysis of 14 incumbent German book-publishing 
companies and their responses to digitalization between the early 1990s and 2011. We find that 
members of incumbent organizations make sense of disruptive innovations through their construals of 
two facets of organizational identity, which we label organizational domain identity and organizational 
role identity. Organizational domain identity—a concept closely related to the domain-focused research 
on identity and innovation mentioned above (e.g., Livengood and Reger, 2010)—refers to 
organizational identity claims that stem from members’ perceptions of the category of organizations to 
which their organization essentially belongs. For instance, the members of some of the publishing 
companies we observed predominantly envisioned their organizations as “manufacturers of printed 
books,” while the members of other publishers perceived their firm as belonging to the category of 
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“content providers.” In contrast, organizational role identity—a facet of organizational identity that has 
not yet been conceptualized in prior studies—refers to those organizational identity claims that stem 
from members’ perceptions of their organization’s longstanding, central, and distinct impact on the 
overall development of its respective category and their organization’s essential relation to other 
actors in that category. For instance, some publishers’ members described their organization’s role in 
its category as that of a shaper who leads other players and defines the development of the category, 
while members of other publishers envisioned their organization as follower who adapts to, rather than 
initiates, changes in the category.  
One of our key observations is that members of a firm can independently perceive both of these 
facets of organizational identity as being either challenged or enhanced by the adoption of a disruptive 
innovation. Furthermore, and counter to prior theory (e.g., Anthony and Tripsas, 2016), identity-related 
struggles tend to unfold when there is a dissonance in the identity-driven interpretations, such that 
members predominantly perceive one of the two identity facets as being enhanced and the other as 
being challenged. Finally, we find that, as members attempt to align adaptation with their perceptions 
of organizational identity, the various combinations of these perceptions engender different types of 
responses to the disruption innovation. In the specific case of our study, these response types include 
highly flexible, innovative adoption; flexible non-adoptive responses, or “bold retreats” (Adner and 
Snow, 2010); highly hesitant, rigid adoption (“cramming;” Christensen and Raynor, 2003); and 
aggressive, but somewhat “routine rigid” adoption of the disruption (Gilbert, 2005).  
Our study makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, it advances the emerging 
conversation on the implications of organizational identity in adaptations to disruptive innovations by 
introducing a multifaceted view of organizational identity. In particular, we inductively distill the 
concept of organizational role identity and differentiate it from the previously studied organizational 
domain identity; we also show that, somewhat paradoxically, members can perceive the same 
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disruption as both identity challenging and identity enhancing, depending on how members perceive 
each of these two facets as being affected by a disruptive innovation. Second, these insights allow us to 
offer a more nuanced depiction of how and under which conditions identity-related struggles unfold in 
incumbent organizations, and how organization members deal with those struggles. Third, owing to the 
multi-case study design of our project, we are able to induce theory on how variance in organizational 
identity might lead to variance in organizational adaptation, which represents a novel contribution to 
the discussion on inter-firm response heterogeneity (Eggers and Park, 2018). 
THEORY BACKGROUND 
Disruptive Innovations and Heterogeneity in Adaptive Responses 
Disruptive innovations, which are typically introduced by new entrants, are characterized by 
discontinuous changes in the three elements that constitute value creation and capture: the perceived 
benefit, the architecture of value creation, and the business model (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
With regard to the perceived benefit, disruptive innovations initially underperform established 
approaches in terms of traditional benefit dimensions while simultaneously introducing new benefit 
dimensions, such as ease of use, convenience, and often cheaper prices (Christensen, 1997). In this 
regard, disruptive innovations differ from “sustaining” innovations, which can be as radical in terms of 
the technical improvement but “give customers something more or better in the attributes they already 
value” (Bower and Christensen, 1995, p. 45). Equally importantly, disruptive innovations emerge under 
specific circumstances (Christensen, 1997; Klenner et al., 2013), particularly when the pace of 
technological development outstrips the mainstream demand for improvement (Christensen, Anthony, 
and Roth, 2004). In such situations, customers start to switch to disruptive innovations. This process 
intensifies as disruptive innovations improve, also along the established benefit dimensions, and more 
customers perceive and cherish the new benefits introduced by the disruptive innovation even if they 
initially conceived these benefits as unimportant (Adner, 2002). Another characteristic of disruptive 
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innovations is that they are based on fundamentally new architectures for transforming inputs into 
outputs (see Christensen and Bower, 1996, p. 198) with significant shifts in the underlying cost 
structure (Ansari et al., 2016; Christensen and Bower, 1996). Finally, a disruptive innovation is 
typically deployed in a considerably different business model (Christensen, 2006; Markides, 2006). 
This entails a new approach to transforming value into profit, especially in terms of the revenue and 
pricing structure.  
A disruptive innovation puts established companies in a vexing dilemma (Christensen, 1997). On 
the one hand, disruptive innovations, at least in the long run, can be vital for a firm’s growth and 
survival (Christensen, 1997). Thus, if decision makers decide against adopting an innovation that might 
successfully disrupt the market, they might put their firm’s long-term success at risk. On the other 
hand, however, disruptive innovations are inherently financially unattractive, at least in the short-term. 
This is primarily given the uncertainty involved—indeed, it is difficult to decide ex ante whether a 
given innovation is disruptive and ultimately pans out economically (Klenner et al., 2013)—and 
because established, high-end customers are unwilling to employ the disruptive innovation (Ansari et 
al., 2016). Moreover, disruptive innovations require drastic, expensive, and politically difficult shifts in 
competences and resources (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). As a result, managers are torn between the 
need for adopting disruptive innovations and the pressures to stick to sustaining innovations 
(Christensen, 1997). 
The incumbent’s dilemma is strongly affected by cognitive mechanisms (Gilbert, 2005; Tripsas 
and Gavetti, 2000). Concepts of value creation and capture are social constructions that, over time, turn 
into widely shared cognitive schemas (Garud and Ahlstrom, 1997; Garud and Rappa, 1994, Kaplan 
2011), which are inherently inadequate for making sense of disruptive innovations (Barr, Stimpert, and 
Huff, 1992; Dosi, 1982; Levitt, 1960; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Weick, 2001). As a result, decision 
makers in incumbent organizations often experience difficulties in recognizing and interpreting 
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disruptive innovations (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013; Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003). Outdated 
schemas can lead managers to rigidly stick to old routines (Gilbert, 2005) and to “cram” (Christensen 
and Raynor, 2003) new technologies into established markets (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
Cognitive lenses have also helped to explain why the responses of incumbent firms often vary 
substantially despite these generic inertial forces (Burgelman, 1994; Lant and Mezias, 1990; Tripsas, 
1997; see Eggers and Park, 2018, for a summary). For instance, Gilbert (2005) suggests that the 
commitment of resources to disruptive technologies is stronger when members interpret a new 
innovation as a threat rather than an opportunity. Kammerlander and Ganter (2015) argue that family 
firms’ responses to disruptive technologies depend on the specific goals that CEOs pursue. One 
conversation that is currently unfolding within this research stream centers on one particularly 
influential cognitive structure for incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovation: organizational 
identity (e.g., Tripsas, 2009). 
The Emerging Debate on the Role of Organizational Identity in Disruptive Innovation 
Organizational identity has often been studied in the context of change and adaptation (Gioia et al., 
2013b). This is not surprising given that change puts fundamental assumptions about the organization, 
its goals, its success, and its prospects into question, thereby making organization members more aware 
of their identity perceptions (Ashforth and Mael, 1996; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996). Moreover, 
organizational identity is a deeply embedded cognitive schema (Gustafson, 1995) that strongly 
influences the attention, interpretation, and actions of organization members (Ashforth and Mael, 1996; 
Kogut and Zander, 1996). In that regard, most of the literature has portrayed organizational identity as 
a change preventer because change a priori contradicts the concept of a more or less enduring identity 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1996; Burgelman, 1994; Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, 1994). In fact, members 
of organizations typically try to protect their identity perceptions by conservatively sticking to well-
proven processes and structures (Brown and Starkey, 2000). However, some studies have noted that 
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perceived threats to organizational identity are effective triggers of change (Elsbach and Kramer, 
1996). For example, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) showed how perceptions of a threatened 
organizational identity forced decision makers to dramatically alter the way the New York Port 
Authority treated homeless people seeking shelter in its facilities. 
A growing stream of research that builds on these insights indicates that organizational identity 
carries great potential to provide a more grounded understanding of incumbents’ attempts to adapt to 
disruptive innovations (e.g., Altman and Tripsas, 2015; Tripsas, 2009). In a recent literature review, 
Anthony and Tripsas (2016) suggest that members consider whether their shared perceptions of 
organizational identity are enhanced or challenged when they engage in an innovation activity. 
Moreover, these authors argue that if members perceive an innovation activity as “identity enhancing,” 
they are, ceteris paribus, more likely to pursue it than if they feel that doing so would violate the 
attributes that constitute their organization’s identity. In addition, organizations might differ 
significantly with regard to how they resolve dysfunctional conflicts and struggles that arise when a 
considered innovation activity challenges perceptions of organizational identity (Garud and 
Karunakaran, 2017). For instance, companies might reframe the innovation activities so that they 
appear to fit the organizational identity or they might shift organizational identity claims to 
accommodate the innovation (Tripsas, 2009).  
 “Domain”-focus of extant research on identity and innovation. As noted by Anthony and 
Tripsas (2016), the large majority of studies on organizational identity and (disruptive) innovation 
conceptualize organizational identity as deeply engrained perceptions of belonging to a certain 
competitive category or group. Livengood and Reger (2010) refer to these perceptions as an 
organization’s “identity domain” and explain that these perceptions often refer to products or processes 
as attributes of an organization’s identity. An example for this domain-focused view is O’Reilly and 
Tushman’s (2004) account of how executives at USA Today attempted to shift the firm’s identity away 
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from a “newspaper” and towards the notion of a “network.” Watkiss and Glynn (2016) show that this 
categorical, domain-focused conceptualization of organizational identity is well-established in the 
institutionalist or sociological perspectives on organizational identity and strongly affects 
organizational attention, interpretation, and action (see also Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Navis and 
Glynn, 2010; Porac et al., 1989). The domain-focused view also is critical in the context of disruptive 
innovations because such shifts are likely to emerge at the periphery of incumbents’ identity domains 
(Tripsas, 2009), and to affect their boundaries (Adner, 2012; Ansari et al., 2016). Specifically, the more 
the members of an organization perceive a disruptive innovation as occurring inside rather than outside 
the boundaries of their identity domain, the more attentive they will be to that innovation and the more 
motivated they will be to embrace it (Livengood and Reger, 2010).  
However, despite these advances, the predictive power of our knowledge on the role of 
organizational identity in times of disruption remains limited as we still know very little about how 
differences in organizational identity contribute to heterogeneity in incumbent adaptations to disruptive 
innovation. Part of the problem is the lack of identity-focused, cross-case comparisons of structurally 
similar incumbents and their responses to disruptive innovations, which are necessary to discover 
nuanced differences in response patterns (for a notable exception, see Tripsas, 2013). Theoretically 
more critical is the somewhat limited conceptualization of organizational identity in the extant studies, 
which have largely ignored that organizational identity is in fact a multifaceted construct. 
Organizational identity as multifaceted construct. Gustafson (1995) was perhaps the first to 
highlight that organizational identity cannot be reduced to categorical, membership-defined views but 
“transcend[s] any particular product, process, time or environment” (Gustafson and Reger, 1995, p. 
464). Thus, to comprehensively understand a firm’s organizational identity, we must not only consider 
the category to which members believe their organization belongs, but also members’ perceptions 
regarding “why or how things are done” in their organization (Gustafson and Reger, 1995; Stimpert, 
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Gustafson, and Sarason, 1998) and the organization’s essential values and beliefs (Ashforth, Harrison, 
and Corley, 2008; Nag et al., 2007). Such multifaceted perspective is highly important because 
disruptive innovation affects not only the (perceived) boundaries of a domain, but also—by 
definition—the mental models, beliefs, and values regarding how companies approach value creation 
and capture. Thus, organizational identity is likely to have a more complex and nuanced influence on 
adaptation to disruptive innovation than suggested by the purely domain-focused accounts on the topic.  
Surprisingly, the extant research remains silent about which facets of organizational identity—
other than the categorical facet that we label organizational domain identity—surface in the context of 
disruptive innovation or how they might influence incumbents’ adaptive behaviors. Our study, which 
was based on an inductive epistemology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), thus began without specific 
preconceptions of how the multifacetedness of organizational identity might affect adaptation. 
Ultimately, it revealed the concept and the distinct influence of organizational role identity as another 
influential facet of organizational identity. Below—especially in our description of emergent 
findings—we further explain organizational role identity and related extant theories and concepts.  
METHODS 
Research Design, Setting, and Sample 
To answer our research questions, we studied the responses of established German book and magazine 
publishing companies to the emergence of digital products and services—especially e-books and apps, 
as well as such offerings as flat-fee access to various forms of electronic media—with a primary focus 
on the period between the early 1990s and the end of 2011. The first digitized books were 
commercially published in Germany in the 1990s. By the end of 2011, a dominant design for digital 
publishing had been established, driven largely by the launch of Apple’s iPad and Amazon’s Kindle in 
Germany.  
We chose this setting because digitalization in publishing represents an archetypal case of a 
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disruptive innovation for several reasons (Benhamou, 2015). First, digital publishing reshaped the 
bundle of benefits offered to customers. Prior to the advent of digitalization, innovations in the 
publishing industry primarily improved performance with regard to either the content (e.g., new genres, 
new authors) or physical attributes of the printed medium (e.g., haptics, layout, illustrations, cover 
design). Moreover, to stimulate customer interest, publishers tried to gain premium shelf space in major 
bookstores, invested in presentations at major book fairs, and sought favorable reviews from journalists 
in printed newspapers (König, 2009). In addition mainstream customers were overserved with regard to 
focal traditional benefit dimensions such as haptics and layout, and they were unwilling to invest in 
expensive improvements in these dimensions, as shown, for instance, by the success of pocket books. 
While digital publishing underperformed in many of the traditional performance metrics such as 
haptics and layout, it highlighted other benefits that had previously been secondary or non-existent, 
such as 24/7 availability, dictionary functions, interactivity, customer ratings, and publishing speed.  
Second, digital publishing was based on substantially different architectures and processes of 
value creation. This required different skills and competencies within the organization because 
knowledge of physical printing and layout equipment—previously a core competency of publishing 
houses—was replaced with knowledge of technologies that allowed for storage of information in 
databases and knowledge of different electronic formats (Ronte, 2001). Digital publishing also required 
integration with a new set of complementors (Adner, 2012). For instance, content had to be compatible 
with e-readers (e.g., Thalia’s Tolino and Amazon’s Kindle), which were constantly changing.  
Third, digitalization fundamentally changed profit formulas and business models in the 
publishing industry. For example, digitalization allowed for new ways of generating revenue, such as 
flat-rate models. Moreover, publishing houses were no longer dependent on brick-and-mortar book 
sellers, as they could undertake direct sales to end customers through their websites. At the same time, 
new entrants, mostly from the software industry, started to offer books and magazines at substantially 
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lower prices. These business models were partially enabled by self-publishing services, such as Kindle 
Direct Publishing from Amazon.com and new methods of cross-subsidization, such as Google’s 
approach of selling search data to advertising clients. Given these changes and the high levels of 
ambiguity and uncertainty, most incumbents initially viewed the idea of adopting digitalization as 
difficult, or even completely unattractive. In fact, archival sources from the German National Industry 
Association of Book Publishers (BOEV) show that, similar to other disruptive innovations described in 
the literature (Christensen and Raynor, 2003), innovations in digital publishing were almost exclusively 
introduced and fostered by new entrants, such as Google (Books), Amazon, and Apple. 
The German book-publishing industry provides a particularly rich context for studying the 
responses of incumbent book publishers to digitalization because in Germany books play a particularly 
important role in society (Schulze, 2001). For instance, more schools in Germany are named after 
Johannes Gutenberg, the inventor of mechanical movable type printing (59 schools listed in the school 
directories of the 16 German federal states from 2012), than are named after Martin Luther (47) and 
Ludwig van Beethoven (8). The historical identification of German culture with book publishing is also 
evidenced by the Frankfurter Buchmesse and the Leipziger Buchmesse—widely regarded as 
particularly important international book fairs and major cultural events, with a tradition spanning more 
than 500 years.  
We applied a theoretical sampling logic (Yin, 1994) and analyzed 14 of the most important 
German book publishers (according to BOEV). As our aim was to explain heterogeneity in response 
patterns, we included companies that varied in their embracing of digitalization. We focused our 
analysis on those firms that were among the hundred top-selling book publishers at the turn of the 
century. Further, we only included companies that were at least fifty years old and that employed at 
least fifty people in order to focus on those firms in which routines existed and in which an identity had 
formed prior to digitalization (see Table I for further characteristics of the sampled firms). Furthermore, 
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privileged access to confidential data, which was provided to us by company representatives for the 
purpose of conducting this study, was an important selection criterion. We added cases until we found 
that new cases would only add marginally to our theoretical understanding (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table I about here 
---------------------------------- 
Data Collection 
Table II summarizes the data that we collected. Our data sources included web pages, interviews, 
unobtrusive observations, and other archival material.  
Archival, longitudinal documents. We collected data from archival sources, including press 
clippings and (partially confidential) company presentations. We also collected an extensive number of 
historical webpages dating back to the mid-1990s, which we accessed via http://web.archive.org in line 
with previous research stating that the World Wide Web is a useful source for capturing an 
organization’s identity (Coupland and Brown, 2004). Certain sections, such as “About Us” and “Our 
History,” were particularly important, as they offered time-stamped data on incumbents’ identities 
before and during the publishers’ adaptations to digitalization. In particular, we used the book 
publishers’ own descriptions, editorial letters published on the websites, and descriptions of the 
company’s history to learn more about the facets of identity that were particularly influential. In 
addition, such sections as “News,” “Press Releases,” “Letter from the Editor,” and “Products” often 
provided information on each incumbent’s interpretation of the disruptive innovation and on its product 
portfolio, especially with regard to new (digital and print) product offerings and product abandonment. 
On average, we were able to analyze the websites in two-year increments. 
Interviews. We conducted 70 semi-structured interviews with the CEOs of the 14 focal firms 
(average length: 75 minutes), managers and employees of the 14 firms, industry experts, and founders 
of new entrants (average length: 60 minutes). While interviews with members of the 14 incumbent 
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publishing firms took place in 2010 and 2011, expert and new entrant interviews were carried out from 
2009 to 2012. Moreover, after the first round of data analysis, and whenever we found gaps in the data, 
we engaged in additional (email-based) conversations with the CEOs to discuss our preliminary 
findings with them. The core objective of the interviews was to identify and investigate activities, 
events, and narratives (Patriotta, 2003) that would reveal how perceptions of firm members influenced 
subsequent adaptation behaviors in incumbent firms. Similar to prior research (Gioia and Thomas, 
1996; Livengood and Reger, 2010), we started by focusing on the top-management level, and 
subsequently interviewed additional employees and managers across hierarchies, departments, and 
tenures. This approach allowed us to obtain a variety of perspectives (Flick, 2009), which helped 
address concerns of retrospective bias (Huber and Power, 1985).  
Our interview guidelines (available from the first author) were primarily informed by the 
literature on adaptations to disruptive innovations. Our questions focused on: (1) how incumbents 
interpreted the disruptive innovation (and how and why that changed over time); (2) how incumbents 
launched or “deferred” (Kaplan, 2008b) responses to the disruption (and when those activities took 
place, including information on planned activities); and (3) how the implementation of responses as 
well as feedback on such activities shaped perceptions and additional responses within the 
organizations (and whether there were differences among the perspectives of various stakeholder 
groups, such as top managers, employees, and customers). We encouraged our informants to recall 
concrete examples and events, a technique that provides more comprehensive and accurate accounts, 
and prevents post-hoc rationalization (Fisher and Geiselman, 2010). Interviews were recorded and 
verbally transcribed within one weeki.  
Supplementary data. We collected supplementary data, which we used to triangulate the 
interview and archival data and to address alternative explanations. For instance, we took detailed notes 
during our on-site observations, which helped us make sense of the interviewees’ statements, and we 
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asked the interviewees to fill out additional surveys that provided us, for example, with information 
regarding the network ties they frequently built on. Furthermore, we unobtrusively observed members 
of the focal organizations at industry conferences, some of which were specifically dedicated to the 
topic of digitalization, and at large book fairs. Those observations helped us to interpret and triangulate 
the information gathered from the interviews. In addition, the second author had the opportunity to 
observe decision makers from large book retailers during numerous executive seminars (none of them 
involving the studied companies). That author also collaborated with the industry association BOEV on 
a four-month university consulting project and witnessed a steering board meeting of the BOEV where 
senior representatives of the industry discussed the uncertainty associated with digitalization. We 
compared insights from this supplementary data with information contained in other sources to 
systematically triangulate our emerging findings (Jick, 1979; Jonsen and Jehn, 2009).  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table II about here 
---------------------------------- 
Data Analysis 
Our analysis, which followed the general approach of grounded theory (Gioia et al., 2013a; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967), was informed by procedures developed in prior studies on adaptation to discontinuous 
innovations (Kammerlander and Ganter, 2015; Kaplan, 2008b; König, Schulte, and Enders, 2012). We 
first summarized each case and extracted first-order concepts from the interviews and archival material 
in an open coding process (Mayring, 2008; Van Maanen, 1979). Thereafter, while comparing cases, we 
iteratively aggregated first-order categories into second-order themes and overarching dimensions of 
identity-driven interpretations and responses (Gioia et al., 2013a). On the basis of comparisons of 
patterns in the various cases, and the observation that they replicated the emerging patterns (Yin, 1994), 
we derived a mid-range theory on organizational-identity-driven processes and incumbent responses to 
disruptive innovations.  
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Throughout the data-analysis process, we regularly performed inter-coder agreement checks 
(Krippendorff, 2004) among the two to six coders (depending on the phase of analysis) and used 
divergences to further enhance the reliability of our coding.ii Finally, after we obtained a good match 
between the emerging theory and the data, we re-engaged in communication with our informants and 
with experts (e.g., at the annual meeting of the International Society for Book Studies) in order to 
validate our observations (Flick, 2009). Our emerging data structure (Nag et al., 2007) is illustrated in 
the online Appendix (Table A-I), including exemplary archival evidence and quotes. The data structure 
comprises facets of organizational identity that emerged as important throughout our analysis as well as 
categories and themes regarding the ways in which members perceived these facets of identity as being 
enhanced and challenged, the struggles that evolved under certain circumstances, and variance in 
response behavior. We iteratively improved this data structure, revolving back and forth between extant 
theory and our case observations (Eisenhardt, 1989), and used it as the basis for developing our final 
process model (see Figure 2) which we explain below, after describing four exemplary cases.  
EMERGENT FINDINGS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF EXEMPLARY CASES 
When making sense of the adaptive processes in the individual cases, we noted that members’ 
perceptions of “To which category of organizations do we essentially belong?” and “What is our 
competitive home turf?” strongly influenced their interpretations of the disruptive innovation and the 
subsequent adaptation processes, as suggested by the extant research on organizational identity and 
disruptive innovation. However, in line with our initial intuition, we also realized that a second, not yet 
conceptualized, facet of identity surfaced in members’ claims about their organizations’ identities and 
played an equally crucial role in their companies’ adaptive behaviors. These claims referred to 
perceptions regarding “Who are we with regard to our central and distinctive impact on the overall 
development of our category?” and “What is our essential relation to other actors in our category?”. In 
particular, members referred to perceptions of their organizations as either shapers that form their 
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respective category’s overall trajectory and lead the other actors, or followers that adapt to their field’s 
development and react to external demands.  
We labeled these constructs organizational domain identity and organizational role identity, 
respectively. We chose the term organizational domain identity because the underlying idea relates to 
Livengood and Reger’s (2010) concept of “identity domains.” We chose organizational role identity 
because the identity perceptions encompassed by this facet echoed, to a certain extent, the nature of 
individual role identities described in social identity theory—institutionalized characters that people in 
certain social positions perform and, over time, identify with (Burke and Tully, 1977; Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986).  
As illustrated in Figure 1, we observed substantial variance in how members of incumbent firms 
perceived their organizations’ domain and role identities and how these identity facets were affected by 
the disruptive innovation. Specifically—despite their considerable initial homogeneity in terms of 
products, customers, and skills—some organizations perceived their domain identity as enhanced 
because the disruptive innovation was perceived as falling within the organization’s “home turf.” 
Others, in contrast, perceived their domain identity as challenged by the disruptive innovation because 
they perceived the disruptive innovation as falling outside their domain and, consequently, that 
adopting those technological developments would threaten their domain identity.  
Likewise, we observed that members of companies with a follower role identity felt that adopting 
the disruption would enhance that role identity, primarily because it presented an opportunity to fulfill 
new market demands. In contrast, members in organizations with a shaper identity felt that the 
disruptive innovation challenged the role identity. More specifically, they believed that the disruptive 
innovation introduced new benefit dimensions that their company was unable to provide, and they 
perceived their company’s routines and resources as inferior to those of the new entrants. Thus, 
adopting digitalization would challenge their role as shaper. Interestingly, as discussed in the future 
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section, we did not observe cases of enhanced shaper role identities or challenged follower identities.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
In the following, we first provide descriptive accounts of four exemplary cases—Leo Books, 
Taurus Print, Gemini & Sons, and Libra Press—which vary with regard to their members’ perceptions 
of domain identity and role identity and show how the two identity facets affected companies’ 
interpretations and responses when making sense of digitalization. Thereafter, we build on these and 
the ten other cases to induce a model that generalizes our observations into a mid-range theory.  
Leo Books 
Founded shortly after World War II, Leo Books had grown to a medium-sized publisher with over 200 
employees by the end of the 20th century. In its early years, the publisher focused on loose-leaf 
collections, but it quickly extended its portfolio to include fiction, reference books, textbooks, trade 
magazines, and newsletters. 
Early attention to digitalization. As early as 1999, Leo Books emphasized the opportunities that 
digitalization and “new media” offered for book publishers (“About Us,” website) and explicitly noted 
that embracing the new digital technologies was “an almost self-evident consequence [of the 
company’s] holistic [world view].” As reflected in multiple website and brochure statements, these 
perceptions continued, as members sensed that Leo Books had always essentially been “[a provider of] 
information and knowledge [and] not only printed papers” (“About Us,” website, 2001; similar in 2004 
company brochure and CEO and manager interviews).  
Emerging struggle to maintain shaper identity while embracing digitalization. Despite 
members’ perceptions that digitalization would enhance Leo Books’ domain identity, it took the 
company several years, until 2002, to start implementing the disruptive innovation. A manager 
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described this period of standstill: “Everyone wanted it [i.e., embracing digitalization], [… but] there 
were many discussions. It was a struggle.” The CEO explained this struggle in more detail: 
[We did not feel threatened economically. Rather, it was] the fear of failure—our culture of perceiving 
ourselves as the best—that made us afraid that we would be unable to measure up to the standard of our 
own expectations. … [Moreover,] we want to decide on our own what to do and what is right for our 
customers [instead of following what Google and Amazon tell us to do. … We prefer initiatives] created 
from the inside. To remain self-contained [is our] ultimate goal. 
 
Other statements made by interviewees underscored the CEO’s notion that there was no shared vision 
of how digital initiatives could fit members’ perceptions of the company as an independent leader or 
“shaper” (CEO) in its field. In this regard, the “About us” sections of Leo Books’ website and the 
company’s mission statementsiii continually pointed to “autonomy” and “independence” in strategic 
decisions as essential to the company as an information and knowledge provider. Moreover, other 
interviewees emphasized that the company wished to lead in the development of digital technologies, 
even if doing so required overcoming customer resistance. For instance, one manager stated: 
When you ask customers ‘What do you want?’, you usually get vague answers based on something you 
have already seen. … Our customers are very conservative with regard to digitalization. 
 
However, members recognized that new and powerful entrants such as Apple, Amazon, and Google, 
would dictate the rules for the digital publishing world. As such, Leo Books’ decision makers felt the 
company’s role identity challenged as they could not see how they could pursue digitalization in a way 
that would reinforce their view of the company as a shaper of its market, instead of being driven by 
some external forces. For example, when asked why it was so hard for Leo Books to decide on any 
specific, major digital initiatives, one manager noted that members at Leo Books struggled to find ways 
to embrace digitalization while staying true to the shaper identity: “We do not just want to be a player 
in the market. We want to offer unique value.” 
Until 2002, top management met multiple times with the aim of resolving this struggle. The CEO 
noted: “We talked about the right approach to digitalization every day.” However, the search and the 
conversations appeared to be stuck. A manager explained: “[We were] intensively searching for a 
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comprehensive and sustainable solution […]. Unlike other publishing houses, we did not want to start 
with smaller, individual projects.” When pondering why Leo Books struggled in this respect, another 
employee stated: “[Our] philosophy is to offer not only the highest-quality content but also the best 
technological solutions,” and meeting these expectations seemed inconceivable. The CEO noted, “[we 
could not find a] holistic solution […] that […] went beyond our competitors’ offerings.” Overall, the 
struggles were tedious and dysfunctional. Notably, during this time, Leo Books did not innovate 
substantially in either the new digital domain or the established print domain. 
Innovative adoption of the disruption triggered by a discovery. The situation started to change in 
2002 when the top management team discovered an approach that finally allowed it to embrace digital 
technology in a relatively novel way that built on the firm’s internal knowledge. According to sources 
on various hierarchical levels, members of Leo Books realized that a previously internally developed 
database could be used as a basis for digitalizing the company’s products. This proprietary database 
was to become the “linchpin of [Leo Books’] digital product portfolio” (website, 2013). As soon as this 
opportunity was identified, a substantial amount of financial and human resources was dedicated to 
further developing digital products. In this regard, one manager noted “when you have your own ideas 
that are fundamentally different from your competitors’ ideas, then you have to give them a shot.” 
In the ensuing years, the company introduced such products as proprietary, topic-focused social-
network software; Internet TV; e-books; a variety of applications; audio files; social communities; 
premium electronic newsletters; and online seminars, which also allowed them to broaden their 
business model. In 2006, it summarized its progress as follows: 
As in the past, we see ourselves as leaders in our market. With our digital product, we set totally new 




Since 2007, Leo Books has won numerous innovation prizes for its digital products. In a 2017 press 
release, the CEO indicated that Leo Books had indeed found a way to adopt digitalization that fitted the 
role identity of a shaper: 
I am looking forward to the tasks lying ahead of us, especially with regard to further progressing with 
digitalization. […] We are confident that we will respond to these tasks with standard-setting products. 
 
Taurus Print 
Taurus Print was founded shortly after World War II as a publisher of reference books and calendars. It 
grew into a medium-sized company with approximately 75 employees as of 2012. The portfolio was 
continuously adapted by adding reference books on a broad variety of topics and fiction books, as well 
as abandoning the calendar segment. 
No intention to embrace digitalization. Although members of Taurus Print were aware of the 
digitalization trend in the 1990s, they viewed digitalized products as “second-rate” and expressed their 
unwillingness to produce and sell them (“About Us” webpage 1997). Along these lines, the CEO noted: 
Our standards have to remain the same. In that regard, we are absolutely uncompromising. […]. We will 
not produce junk just to survive. 
 
Similarly, a top manager explained in a press interview: “We have always enjoyed creating beautiful 
books and we will continue to do so.” In an interview with us, an employee noted that “[our identity 
focuses on] producing pretty, formidable books that we like to exhibit and sell in book shops,” while a 
manager described the core of Taurus Print as “the print medium per se.” Moreover, the CEO denied in 
his interview with us that digitalization fell within his organization’s domain identity, emphasizing that 
electronic books “lack the sensual pleasure associated for instance, with turning pages” and that, “[our 
customers] are people who enjoy reading books [made of paper], not nerds surfing on the Internet.” 
Absence of struggles and reinforcement of innovative initiatives in the established domain. We 
did not find any signs of identity struggles for Taurus Print. Notably, management quickly and 
unanimously decided to “continue to produce books as we have done in the past” (interview with 
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employee). The CEO confirmed in his interview with us that he did not “believe in any digital business 
models for [Taurus Print]” and, as such, believed that “not much will change in the future.”  
Interestingly, even though both Taurus Print’s domain and role identities were challenged by 
digitalization, the publisher’s response was not inert but highly innovative, only that the company’s 
innovations focused on the established domain of printed books. In particular, around the year 2000, 
the company invested substantial financial and human capital in the further development of print books 
(manager, interview). Moreover, they invited book designers to post photos of their most beautiful 
books in specific sections of the website in order to promote and acknowledge the design of innovative, 
artistic books (website, starting in 2000). Several of the books published by Taurus Print received 
national design awards between 2000 and 2010 (website, press releases). In the same decade, Taurus 
Print widened its portfolio by including new topic areas, contracting with international best-selling 
authors, and introducing new user benefits in the high-end segment of printed books (e.g., introduction 
of lightweight books in 2012).iv 
Our data indicate that Taurus Print’s decision to invest in substantial “sustaining” innovations in 
the old domain was at least partly a reflection of its members’ strong perception of the organization as a 
shaper. For example, organization members described Taurus Print as “the most renowned publishing 
house of the post-war era in our segment” (CEO, interview) and as a company that had always assumed 
the role of a clear “leader [that] created its core market—there was nothing like that before” (manager, 
interview). Apparently, this identity strongly influenced innovation:  
Other publishing houses say “Okay, we are a service provider—we want to be on it.” We are not like that. 
We work on issues internally and try to optimize everything before launching them. (Employee) 
 
In a similar vein, a top manager acknowledged in a press interview that even though the demand for 
printed books might decrease, the company would still focus on this activity, as “a well-managed 
publishing house would not die just because of decreasing customer demand.” The CEO noted  
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We are dinosaurs in that regard. […] We will see who will die and who will survive. However, we are 
ready to fight.  
 
When reflecting on Taurus Print’s activities with regard to digitalization, in a 2013 press interview, a 
top manager stated: “Work at the publishing house has not changed a lot.” Indeed, even at the time of 
writing this study, the company continued to offer only very few digital products.  
Gemini & Sons 
Gemini & Sons was founded more than 150 years ago as a bookstore, but it quickly entered the 
publishing business. At the time of our study, it was a medium-sized publisher with approximately 75 
employees and primarily active in the textbook and workbook segments in numerous topic areas.  
Attention to digitalization but reluctance to embrace it. Organization members of Gemini & 
Sons noticed the emergence of digitalization in the late 1990s when competitors initiated round-table 
discussions on the topic. At the same time, they perceived the commitment to the “graphic design of 
books” and the “development of [printed] books—from the acquisition of authors to sales” as being at 
the core of the company’s identity (“About Us,” website 2001, 2006). One manager explained the 
organization’s self-perception as “we publish books” and noted that anything else (e.g., digitalization) 
was “peripheral.” Correspondingly, organization members were reluctant to embrace digital products. 
One manager predicted: “Our core products are printed books. […] We will not change our business in 
the coming years.” The disruption clearly challenged the domain identity. 
Despite the strong rejection of digital products, company members perceived significant pressure 
to pursue digitalization actively. As explained by one manager, starting in the early 2000s, decision 
makers noted that the customer demand for digitalized solutions, such as e-books, apps, and software, 
was increasing. This manager also recalled that she and her colleagues (including the CEO) perceived 
increasing external pressure for digitalization: 
We had a subscription to the industry association’s magazine, which had more on more e-book reports on 
the front page … showing us that we would not be able to avoid this trend. … Moreover, at many 
industry association conferences and other gatherings of publishing houses, digitalization became the 
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focus of discussions. At those meetings, members of [Gemini & Sons] were expected to contribute to the 
discussions. Our CEO realized that we were expected to do something in the field of digitalization. 
 
Emerging struggles. Intriguingly, members’ perceived need to engage in digitalization—even 
though doing so would clearly violate Gemini & Sons’ domain identity—was reinforced by their views 
of their company’s role. Despite the fact that Gemini & Sons was a market leader in several of its 
segments at the time (according to several newspaper articles), members shared a strong perception of 
their organization as a “servant” (chief editor, around 2000) rather than a shaper. The CEO noted that, 
given this role perception, the company had little choice but to embrace digitalization:  
The market dictates the terms. […] We do what the customer wants [us] to do. […] Over the more than 
100 years of our company’s history, we have always tried to keep a watchful eye on what is happening 
outside and to orient ourselves towards the large competitors.  
 
The result was a struggle that many organization members felt at that time. A long-tenured middle 
manager noted that digitalized products did not fit with what the company stood for, but:  
When something new happens, we have to react. When the customers decide that they need new product 
innovations, then we have to react.  
In fact, the dilemma between the desire to stick with Gemini & Sons’ domain identity as a book 
publisher and the desire to accommodate the organization’s role identity by fulfilling emerging 
customer needs was so evident that managers discussed it not only internally but also externally. In a 
public letter published on the company’s website in 2005, the CEO summarized the struggles that he 
and his top management colleagues faced: 
Where do we come from? Who are we? Where do we want to go? [Shall we] frivolously follow whims 
and current consulting trends? 
In his interview with us, the CEO elaborated:  
We now have to deal with demands that are initially virulent and do not fall within our business area. I 
would prefer a world in which product digitalization did not exist. […] Digitalization is a plague but we 
cannot avoid it. 
Persistent struggles and inertia. The identity dilemma at Gemini & Sons resulted in highly 
dysfunctional, time-consuming, innovation-hampering conflicts and stagnation. A manager described 
the situation as “living under the sword of Damocles.” Gemini & Sons did not hire personnel dedicated 
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to digitalization and it did not invest substantial financial resources in the disruption. According to its 
product catalogue, Gemini & Sons launched one CD-ROM-based program in 2000. Although this 
launch could be interpreted as a cautious step towards digitalization, the company never actively 
promoted it. In the subsequent years, following the advice of several external service providers, Gemini 
& Sons offered a few digital products, such as audio CDs and downloadable content. However, all of 
these efforts merely served the purpose of “support[ing] book sales” (CEO, interview), resembling the 
pattern of cramming or routine rigidity described in the literature (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Gilbert, 2005). Interestingly, the focus of the domain identity as a publisher of printed books even 
intensified, as reflected, for instance, in the fact that Gemini & Sons narrowed its set of competitive 
benchmarks to focus on only three long-time (print book) competitors. In 2007, the CEO noted in a 
speech how this focused domain identity increasingly alienated the firm from the rest of the industry: 
“Getting older makes our company a stranger in its own field. This publishing house ... is a phase-out 
model.” Despite this assessment, Gemini & Sons has not changed its approach toward digitalization. 
Libra Press 
Libra Press, a publisher with more than 500 employees, was founded a century ago. Prior to the 
emergence of digitalization, Libra Press focused on reference books, textbooks, trade magazines, and 
(temporarily) customer magazines. While its core business has remained stable over time, the topical 
focus and targeted customer groups have changed substantially. 
Early embracing of digitalization. Members of Libra Press quickly recognized digitalization as 
an important issue. As early as 1991, the CEO predicted “the rise of digitalization” in a speech to other 
publishers. Moreover, early on, archival sources described Libra Press as a provider of “knowledge 
transfer that is relevant to practice” without any specific reference to “books” or “printed products” 
(website, early 1990s). Statements from archival websites, such as “we serve society by providing 
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information in the form of print and electronic media” (1996), show that Libra Press embraced 
digitalization as an attribute of its domain identity. Correspondingly, the CEO noted: 
Some of our competitors are, of course, classical publishing houses. However, new competitors, 
especially content mediators such as Google, Xing, Internet newsgroups, and even industry fairs, have 
become even more important. 
Interestingly, members of Libra Press and archival sources highlighted role identity perceptions as 
additional reasons for why the adoption of digitalization enhanced the organization’s identity. 
Generally, the role of Libra Press as perceived by its organization members was that of “serving 
society” (“About us,” website since 1996) with a “focus on satisfying customers” (website since 2002). 
Members noted that “the changes in the media industry [driven by digitalization] are the biggest 
changes seen in centuries—some say since the invention of the printing press” (CEO, interview). Thus, 
when members perceived that “the market required [digitalization]” (production manager), its pursuit 
fit with the company’s approach to following market developments.  
Absence of struggles. We did not detect any struggle in Libra Press’s response pattern. Decision 
makers quickly agreed to adopt digital solutions. As early as 1997, the Libra Press website stated that 
“We will attend to the rapid technological change [triggered by digitalization].” According to the CEO,  
Top management proposed ‘Let’s do that!’. The 89-year old owner […] said: ‘That is an opportunity!’. 
Then we invested a two-digit million euro amount. 
 
Interestingly, the decision to adopt digitalization was made even though doing so required “massive 
changes [with regard to products, processes and required capabilities]” (production manager).  
In the initial adoption phase, which lasted from the mid-1990s to approximately 2002, the 
company launched such products as CD-ROMs, online periodicals, and an online shop. In 2002, the 
company also announced a partnership with an e-learning company. However, the adoption activities 
ceased in 2002 when the dot-com bubble burst, customer interest in digital products waned, and critical 
voices against digitalization emerged. In line with the customer trends and the company’s deeply 
engrained custom of following external developments, Libra Press reduced its digitalization efforts: 
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When the dot-com bubble burst, we stopped all [digitalization-related] activities. […] We only restarted 
in 2006 and we did so in a very powerful way. In other words, we invested a lot of money. (CEO, 
interview) 
 
As indicated by the CEO, the third phase of adoption began in 2006, as customer demand for online 
products started regaining momentum. Libra Press sold its printing plant, and re-entered digital 
publishing and widescale online activities. Moreover, the company hired a high two-digit number of 
employees to handle the firm’s digital department.  
Adoption activities characterized by lack of innovativeness. Perhaps the most intriguing twist in 
the Libra Press case was that the aggressive digitalization initiatives did not result in the most 
innovative, or unique products, even though the company experienced few identity-related struggles 
and debates. In fact, most of Libra Press’s digital products were merely copies of competitors’ products 
(manager). As one Libra Press employee noted, despite all of the investments, “the majority of our 
online content was reused print content.” Another employee criticized the lack of “killer applications,” 
and an editor summarized: “[We] lacked entrepreneurial spirit and good ideas for products.” Our 
informants wondered why the company had this problem of being somewhat stuck in its existing 
routines. In this regard, one manager noted in a 2015 interview with the press:  
We are often too busy with our business to radically change something and, maybe, too busy to ask 
totally novel questions.  
One employee added that the problem might be related to the general approach to decision making: 
“[Management] blindly believe[s] the trend analyses and models provided by external consultants.” 
 Cross-case Comparison and Model Development 
The four exemplary cases—Leo Books, Taurus Print, Gemini & Sons, and Libra Press—illustrate a set 
of patterns that we also observed in the other 10 cases. This set of patterns serves as the basis of our 
mid-range theory and relates to three central aspects: challenging and enhancing domain identity and 
role identity; the struggles that unfold when one identity facet is challenged and the other is enhanced, 
and their resolution; and the heterogeneous responses of incumbent firms determined by the identity-
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driven interpretations and struggles. Table III provides an overview of the findings, which we present 
in detail below (see Table A-II in the online Appendix for more fine-grained detail). Based on the 
emerging patterns, we induce our general mid-range theory, which is summarized in Figure 2, as well 
as the special application of that theory illustrated in Figure 3.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table III and Figures 2 and 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Challenging and enhancing domain identity and role identity. Similar to the four exemplary 
cases, the 10 other sampled firms acknowledged digitalization as an important development, but they 
differed substantially in their perceptions of how its adoption would affect their identities. Three of 
these further cases resembled Taurus Print and Gemini & Sons in that organization members perceived 
adopting digitalization as a challenge to their domain identity. For instance, organization members of 
Reader’s Finest considered their business as “very book-affine. We like the haptics. We like the smell. 
We like the sound [of turning pages]” (employee). Accordingly, they sensed that digital products would 
not fall into their home turf and that the implementation of digital technologies and a digital business 
model would contradict their domain identity perception, so they confined their activities to printing 
books. As the CEO of Reader’s Finest noted, “such initiatives outside of the print business […] would 
be inconceivable for us.” Interestingly, mostly the companies that used “products” (e.g., books) to 
describe their domain identity perceived their domain identity as challenged by the disruption.  
In contrast, seven companies, including Libra Press and Leo Books, believed that embracing 
digitalization would enhance their domain identity perceptions. Those firms mostly described their 
domain identity in terms of the value delivered to customers, such as “providing information.” They 
viewed the innovation as a way to accommodate their goal of delivering content. In this vein, for 
instance, the CEO of Peter’s Publishing House stated: “When talking about books, we do not 
distinguish between print and electronic books. They appear as the same for us.” 
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In most cases, organization members were highly consistent in their perceptions of whether the 
adoption of digitalization challenged or enhanced their firms’ domain identities. However, notably, in 
two cases—House of Books and Reader’s Publisher—the perceptions of top management (“domain 
identity challenged”) differed from perceptions on lower levels, especially among the younger 
employees and managers with shorter tenures (“domain identity enhanced”)v.  
With regard to role identity, members of seven companies, such as Libra Press and Gemini & 
Sons, predominantly perceived their organizations as followers and as “servants” (Chief Editor, Gemini 
& Sons) of society and customers. For those companies, satisfying customer needs was a top priority. 
The CEO of TopPress used a boat metaphor to describe his company’s role in its industry:  
Our firm is like a ship with no final destination. We just move, and we have to make sure we do not move 
too fast or too slow. ... In such turbulent times, we have to carefully check where the wind is coming 
from. Those who do not do so will be in fundamental trouble. ... Our firm’s history has been characterized 
by the fact that we have been able to quickly react to changes and external shocks. ... The only thing that 
I, as CEO, can do is to keep the organization alert so that it can react quickly. 
 
Members of these organizations perceived digitalization as one possible way of enhancing their role 
identities, as the innovation provided them with new ways to satisfy their customers. In this respect, the 
CEO of Superbooks noted:  
Prior to digitalization, we did not have any other medium to convey our content. ... When the publisher 
was established, the only way to mediate and transfer information to customers was in print. 
Similarly, the CEO of Reader’s Publisher explained: “Sometimes we say: ‘Ok, our customers want this, 
so we have to create and offer this product’.”  
In contrast, members of six companies,vi including Taurus Print and Leo Books, felt that 
digitalization challenged their role identities. Those companies defined themselves as shapers, and they 
wished to be “trailblazers” (assistant, Peter’s Publishing House) that would have an impact on the 
development of their industry. They only wanted to work on “projects that suit us” (CEO, Secret 
Books). Members struggled to conceive of a way to embrace digitalization that would enhance this 
shaper identity. Most importantly, they realized that digitalization was first commercialized by new 
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entrants, which left established publishing houses to “copy” those formats instead of developing and 
launching them themselves. For instance, the CEO of Peter’s Publishing House emphasized that his 
organization always asked “Does this fit us [as shapers]?” and added: 
[We had to] endeavor to play an active role among the industry leaders [but that was difficult because] 
normal e-books are as dull as dishwater. There is nothing innovative about them. 
 
Identity-induced struggles and their resolution. Several of the firms in our sample were able to 
decide quickly for or against the adoption of digital technologies, without any struggles. Those were 
exactly the companies in which either both identity facets were enhanced or both identity facets were 
challenged by the disruptive innovation (see the arrow from “interpretations” to “response” in Figure 2, 
labeled as “consonant” interpretation). In the first group of cases (similar to Libra Press; lower-left 
quadrant in Figure 1), the disruptive innovation enhanced the firms’ domain identities and 
simultaneously enhanced their follower role identities. Members of these firms did not perceive any 
identity-related struggles and quickly decided to adopt the disruptive innovation. In these cases, 
members had a broad sense of their companies’ home turf, which often revolved around being a 
content provider rather than being tied to print. As they viewed themselves as followers, they did not 
struggle with the fact that their solutions would not necessarily drive the industry’s evolution. In 
contrast, members of the second group of cases (similar to Taurus Print; upper-right quadrant in Figure 
1) perceived the disruptive innovation as challenging their print-based domain identity as well as their 
role identity a shaper. In those firms, a decision was swiftly made to dismiss digitalization-based 
innovations. Members of these organizations perceived e-publishing and electronic distribution as 
incompatible with their strong identification with printed books. They also conceived it as impossible 
to adopt the disruptive innovation in a way that would enhance their self-perceptions as shapers of the 
field. This was primarily because they viewed their firms’ resources and capabilities as incompatible to 
successfully adopt the disruption. As such, the decisions to stay away from digitalization were made 
“within few weeks” (Rocket Book) and “without lengthy discussions” (Reader’s Finest).  
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Perhaps the most intriguing cases were those in which one of the two identity facets was 
perceived as challenged by the disruptive innovation while the other was perceived as enhanced. Based 
on our evidence, we propose that the enhancement of one and the simultaneous challenging of the other 
organizational identity facet induces dysfunctional struggles and, at least temporary, inertia as well as a 
search for struggle resolution in the affected organizations (see middle of Figure 2). In all of these 
cases, we observed “standstills with massive struggles” (Peter’s Publishing House), such as those 
described above for Leo Books and Gemini & Sons. Notably, while these struggles paralyzed adaptive 
responses in all organizations for an extended period, the nature of those struggles differed. In cases 
like Leo Books (upper-left quadrant in Figure 1), where the domain identity was seen as enhanced and 
the role identity was seen as being challenged, organization members wanted to adopt the disruptive 
innovation. However, they could not initially conceive of a way of doing so without jeopardizing their 
organization’s role. The production manager of Secret Books described the lengthy process of finding 
the organization’s role in the digitalized world as follows:  
[Digitalization] is difficult. It is still very difficult ... Of course, what we could offer is very general 
information put online for download.... However, [developing more advanced digital products] is a 
process that needs more time. Of course, we will go there. ... We have to develop new concepts from 
scratch. ... We have a very positive attitude towards digitalization—I was just very upset when I observed 
the first tentative attempts of other publishers, which were not based on advanced business models. 
 
In cases where members perceived the domain identity as challenged and the role identity as enhanced 
(e.g., Gemini & Sons; lower-right quadrant in Figure 1), organization members found themselves in a 
dilemma—they did not want to adopt digitalization but felt pressured to do so in order to accommodate 
their role of fulfilling customer requests. In this regard, the CEO of Reader’s Publisher, noted:  
If [digitalization and social media are] important for our customers, then we have to adopt them. 
However, I am quite hesitant. Most organization members of [Reader’s Publisher, including myself] 
would prefer to only be involved in print.  
 
Interestingly, we observed that companies in the former group were able to resolve their struggles after, 
for example, intense intra-organizational discussions and employee training (Peter’s Publishing House). 
Companies in the latter group continued to struggle.  
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Heterogeneous responses of incumbent firms. The third theme emerging from our data was that 
specific combinations of domain and role identity (“enhancing” and “challenging”) not only affected 
the sensemaking processes and perceived struggles but ultimately lead to variance in organizations’ 
responses. Notably, our observations are limited as they only include cases of challenged shaper role 
identities and enhanced follower role identities, but no cases of enhanced shaper or challenged follower 
identities. We therefore not only induce a general theory on this pattern (lower part of Figure 2) but 
also a special application of that theory, which is illustrated in Figure 3. 
First, generally, we induce that the firms whose members perceive both, their domain identity and 
their role identity, as “enhanced” by the disruptive innovation quickly adopt that innovation (see Figure 
2). For the specific case of an enhanced follower role identity (in combination with an enhanced 
domain identity) which we observe in our setting, we anticipate an aggressive, but somewhat non-
innovative adoption (lower-left quadrant of Figure 3). All publishers in this group launched their first 
digital products as early as the 1990s, and many of them added multiple revenue channels based on 
digital goods and services (see Table III). However, most of the digital products were e-books based on 
prior printed products, and they were created based on customer requests and other external input. 
Several of the interviewed experts and organization members indicated that those digital products were 
not particularly innovative. We propose that this rather rigid adoption of the disruptive innovation 
might be caused by the simultaneous enhancement of both identity facets and the resulting lack of 
reflection- and search-triggering struggles.  
Second, generally, the firms whose members perceive both identity facets as challenged quickly 
decide against adoption. For the specific case of a challenged shaper domain identity (in combination 
with a challenged domain identity), we expect non-adoption, but highly innovative domain defense 
(upper-right quadrant of Figure 3). These firms neither hired employees to handle digitalization nor 
adapted their internal structures. Interestingly, however, this did not mean that these firms lacked 
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innovation. In fact, the “challenging/challenging” companies in our sample decided to undertake bold 
retreats into niche markets and worked on a series of innovations in the old, print domain, such as the 
introduction of new genres, paper-based quality innovations, intensified promotion of print-based 
products, and the contracting of new authors.  
Third, and most intriguing are incumbents whose members perceive the disruptive innovation as 
enhancing one identity facet while challenging the other. As noted in Figure 2, in these cases, we 
expect generally delayed responses due to the emerging intra-organizational identity struggles, but we 
expect the response type to depend on the specific constellation of identity challenge and enhancement. 
Our data allow specific inferences for cases involving an enhanced domain identity and a challenged 
shaper role identity, namely a highly innovative adoption (upper left quadrant in Figure 3). In these 
cases, the shaper role identity apparently helps organization members to keep looking for disruptive 
solutions that will eventually enhance that role identity. In fact, all firms belonging to this group 
eventually overcame their identity struggles, and they adopted the disruptive technology in a creative 
manner, as evidenced by the various innovation awards they received for digital products. As such, we 
propose that struggles emerging from perceived challenges to shaper role identities might act as 
functional catalyzers for creative thinking and stamina (König, Kammerlander, and Enders, 2013) in 
the search for role identity-enhancing out-of-the-box disruptive solutions. 
Finally, our data also allow for specific suggestions regarding the adaptive behavior of 
incumbents in which members see their company’s domain identities as being challenged while the role 
identities of follower as being enhanced (lower right quadrant in Figure 3)—a highly hesitant, rigid 
adoption. In fact, all firms belonging to this group included in our sample, tussled with ongoing inertia 
because they were unable to overcome their identity struggles. As such, members engaged in lengthy 
discussions that slowed decision making across the organization. In contrast to the 
“enhancement/challenge” type of organization described above, those discussions did not lead to a 
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fruitful discourse and were highly dysfunctional. Therefore, they resulted in a form of organizational 
paralysis that hampered initiatives in both the new and the old technology domains.  
DISCUSSION 
We used qualitative data from multiple cases to build theory on how organizational identity affects 
incumbents’ sensemaking and responses when faced with an emerging disruptive innovation. In 
particular, we revealed that organization members interpret the response options based on how they 
enhance or challenge two distinct facets of organizational identity: domain identity and role identity.  
Our study makes several contributions to the emerging stream of research on organizational 
identity in the context of incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations (e.g., Anthony and Tripsas, 
2016; Tripsas, 2009). First, our cross-case research design introduces to this conversation a 
multifaceted view of organizational identity (Gustafson, 1995), thereby following Altman and Tripsas’ 
(2015) and Anthony and Tripsas’ (2016) calls to extend the focus of the identity-innovation research 
beyond the primarily institutional-sociological view of organizational identity (Navis and Glynn, 2010; 
Watkiss and Glynn, 2016). In particular, we induce the thus far overlooked facet of organizational role 
identity and demonstrate how role identity perceptions surface in the context of disruptive innovation. 
We also propose that disruptive innovations may challenge not only incumbents’ organizational 
domain identities, but also their organizational role identities and, thus, add a new dimension to the 
extant, domain-focused conversation on identity and disruptive innovation (e.g., Livengood and Reger, 
2010). In hindsight, it is theoretically consistent that we find role identity perceptions surfacing in times 
of disruptive innovation because such innovations are typically introduced by new entrants at the 
periphery of established industries (Christensen, 1997), and they tend to have a profound impact on the 
overall social structure of power and influence in the innovation ecosystem or value network (Adner, 
2012; Ansari et al., 2016; König et al., 2012). Arguably though, organizational role identity could also 
have relevance for a wider range of identity-focused inquiries, well beyond the arena of disruptive 
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innovation, just as individual role identity has been shown to affect numerous social outcomes 
(Ashforth, Rogers, and Corley, 2011; Burke and Reitzes, 1981).  
Second, conceptualizing organizational identity as a multifaceted organizational schema and 
collecting rich qualitative data on multiple cases allowed us to show that organizational identity has 
more intricate implications in the context of disruptive innovation than previously suggested (e.g., 
Anthony and Tripsas, 2016), especially complex identity struggles. In general, identity struggles form 
part of the more general, micro-level processes of negotiation and renegotiation (Garud and Rappa, 
1994; Kaplan, 2008a) through which organizations adapt to radical change (Dutton and Dukerich, 
1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Ravasi and Schultz, 2006; Tripsas, 2009). We specifically reveal that 
complex struggles do not necessarily evolve in organizations in which identity is challenged as a 
whole, as has previously been argued (e.g. Tripsas, 2009). Instead, they tend to emerge in organizations 
experiencing a dissonance in identity-driven innovation perceptions (i.e., organization members 
perceive one facet of identity as challenged and another facet as enhanced).  
This insight might also explain central puzzles in extant research on identity and disruption. In 
particular, it might help to explain why, as noted by Anthony and Tripsas, many incumbents responded 
with inertia to disruptive innovations, such as those in the disk-drive industry (Christensen, 1997), even 
though those innovations were identity-enhancing, in the sense that “the boundaries of these industries 
remain[ed] intact despite [these disruptions]” (2016, p. 420)—an anomaly to the general premise that 
companies flexibly adopt identity-enhancing innovations. Our findings might explain this anomaly 
because they indicate that such disruptions might well have been identity-challenging for some 
incumbents in terms of an identity facet other than domain identity.  
Interestingly, our observations suggest that struggles related to a challenged role identity are 
easier to address than challenges related to domain identity. In all of the cases with identity-induced 
struggles, organization members actively searched for identity-consistent ways to embrace the 
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disruptive innovation. Thus, our findings also extend prior descriptions of identity-innovation 
realignment strategies, which have thus far only included changes in the organizational identity to fit 
innovation activities (e.g., Tripsas, 2009) or attempts to “maintain […] identity by selectively 
forgetting or reframing innovative practices” (Anthony and Tripsas, 2016, p. 425). Our observations of 
such cases as Leo Books highlight that organizations that search for identity-enhancing innovations 
might develop particularly creative, “out-of-the-box” solutions that help them identifying activities that 
are in line with their existing identity perceptions. 
Third, these insights help to explain why there is heterogeneity in incumbents’ responses to 
disruptive innovations, despite endemic and powerful inertial forces (for an overview, see Yu and 
Hang, 2010). In fact, while the literature includes numerous descriptions of incumbent myopia and 
inertia (Christensen, 1997; Levitt, 1960; Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) and 
“cramming” (Christensen, 1997), we still know little about the circumstances that enable incumbents to 
adopt a disruption flexibly by building on new mindsets and establishing new routines (Gerstner, 
König, Enders, and Hambrick, 2013; Gilbert, 2005; König et al., 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). 
In particular, we lack insight into the mechanisms that lead to “bold retreats”—highly innovative 
“sustaining” innovations that defend the existing domain (Adner and Snow, 2010)—among incumbent 
firms. Our theorizing can help fill these gaps. Most importantly, it shows that shaper organizational role 
identities are crucial for flexible innovations as they trigger adoption flexibility when the domain 
identity is enhanced and “bold retreats” when the domain identity is challenged. Shaper identities also 
appear to enforce “stamina” in organizational adaptation, which takes the form of continued 
investments in innovation despite possible struggles (König et al., 2013). On the other hand, follower 
role identities might exacerbate “routine rigidity” (Gilbert, 2005), which becomes evident in significant 
but more rigid investments in an innovation. All in all, organizational identity influences central 
mechanisms underlying incumbents’ adaptations to disruptive innovations and provides rich 
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explanation of anomalies to standard disruptive innovation theory (Gilbert, 2005; King and 
Baatartogtokh, 2015). 
Third, our findings also provide interesting insights into the question of how organizational 
identity is affected by adaptations to disruptive change (e.g., Ravasi and Schultz, 2006; Tripsas, 2009), 
although this aspect not in the center of our theorizing. Interestingly, and somewhat contrary to our 
initial expectations, we observed only one major shift in organizational role identity: members of 
Books and More initially viewed their organization as a follower. However, after a major post-merger 
organizational restructuring in 2003, these perceptions shifted towards a shaper identity. This shift was 
also reflected in an increasing sense that the organization’s role identity was being challenged by the 
disruptive innovation. As for domain identity perceptions, in contrast, we did not observe cases in 
which organizations changed their identity to align it to the disruptive innovation. In fact, Gemini & 
Sons showed a narrowing of the domain identity when digitalization emerged, as reflected in the 
reduction of the relevant “peer group” to three established book publishers. While this response 
resembles the “ego defenses” to identity threats that Brown and Starkey (2000) describe (e.g., denial 
and rationalization), it seems to contradict the broadening of the domain identity in the face of radical 
change observed in many studies (e.g., the shift from a concrete, product-based identity domain to a 
more abstract identity domain as a platform provider as described by Altman and Tripsas, 2013). Note 
that we included an arrow from the lower part of Figure 2 (responses) to the organizational identity 
perceptions to illustrate the potential recursive effect of adaptive responses on identity perceptions. 
Finally, we offer insights for practitioners. In particular, our study reiterates calls for greater 
managerial awareness of the specificities of disruptive or discontinuous change, and the need to adapt 
processes and structures to different levels of uncertainty (Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie, 1997). 
First, when facing a disruptive innovation, executives should try to assess evolving identity 
perceptions. Moreover, they should be keenly aware of the two facets of domain identity and role 
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identity, and work to foster perceptions of a shaper identity, which seems particularly useful in times of 
disruption (Kreiner and Murphy, 2016). Second, managers should view organizational struggles as 
potential triggers for particularly innovative responses. The struggle itself does not necessarily need to 
be avoided. Instead, dysfunctional struggles need to be transformed into functional ones.  
LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSION 
Our article comes with several limitations, many of which point to interesting avenues for future 
research. Generally, we dedicated a significant amount of time and effort to ruling out the risk of 
retrospective bias through archival data and triangulation, and to investigating potential alternative 
explanations throughout the data-collection and analysis processes. Despite those efforts, other firm-
specific factors might interact with the organization’s identity and, thereby, affect the sensemaking 
process and organizational responses, leading to additional heterogeneity. Thus, scholars should 
scrutinize our findings and their generalizability through replications and extensions.  
One particularly relevant research avenue would be to complete our conceptualization of 
organizational role identities and how they can be challenged by disruptive innovation. As noted 
above, we only observed cases in which disruptive innovations challenged shaper role identities and 
enhanced follower role identities. We did not encounter enhanced shaper identities and challenged 
follower identities. This is not surprising from the perspective of disruptive innovation theory, which 
emphasizes that these innovations, like all discontinuous innovations (Anderson and Tushman, 1990), 
render incumbents’ established competencies obsolete. Thus, a disruptive innovation is likely to 
challenge, rather than enhance, an incumbent’s shaper role identity, which often rests on the notion 
that the organization has historically had a strong influence on the established category that is affected 
by the disruption. Moreover, disruption enhances the adaptive inclination that is included in follower 
identity claims. However, a disruptive innovation could conceivably enhance a shaper role identity or 
challenge a follower role identity. For example, a disruption could enhance the shaper identity of a “de 
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alio” new entrant—an incumbent in another field entering the focal field (Barnett and Burgelman, 
1996). We believe that the general process model displayed in Figure 2 is generalizable to such cases, 
while the matrix provided in Figure 3 relates to specific identity constellations we observed. 
Relatedly, we encourage scholars to illuminate further the emergence, nature, and consequences 
of organizational identity. Notably, organizational identity theory (e.g., Gustafson, 1995) suggests that 
any structure or process, including a strategy, can become a part of members’ construals of their 
organization’s identity over time (Ashforth and Mael, 1996), but how a structure like a strategy 
becomes part of the organizational identity is less clear. For example, a shaper role identity might more 
easily emerge in a company that pursues the generic strategy of a differentiator, and a follower identity 
might be more likely in a company that pursues a cost-leader strategy. However, this relation between 
generic strategy and role identity is highly unclear: members of cost-leading companies like the 
German discount retailer ALDI or the US giant Walmart might well envision their companies as 
shapers of the discount segment. Moreover, in our study, many of the organizations in which members 
shared a shaper perception were not the market leaders in their segment, while certain companies 
whose members perceived their respective organization predominantly as follower were perceived as 
the leading companies by their competitors.  
Another question is which roles other than follower and shaper surface, under which conditions, 
and with what outcomes? We believe scholars will find the shaper and follower archetypes in other 
industries. For example, the car manufacturer Daimler claimed in the context of its responses to 
digitalization: “Our starting point was the invention of the automobile … Our drive is and remains a 
pioneering spirit. This is in our DNA ... We’ve always been in the lead” (Daimler, 2018). However, we 
encourage future research to identify other types of, and illuminate differences in, organizational role 
identities and their implications. This research might benefit from studies on individual role identities, 
but scholars should carefully avoid confusing individual and organizational levels of analysis. 
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Another intriguing contingency that offers ample opportunities for future research relates to the 
question of how top management characteristics might affect the emergence of and differences in 
organizational identities. Questions in this regard include: “To what extent do founders’ constructions 
of identity (Fauchart and Gruber, 2011), especially of organizational domain identity and role identity, 
become embedded in the narrative memory of organizations?” and “Are certain personalities—e.g., 
narcissists, such as Steve Jobs (Isaacson, 2011)—more likely to engrain their individual identities on 
the role identity perceptions of organization members?”. Such studies could be linked to recent insights 
on entrepreneurial identity (Powell and Baker, 2014) or CEO celebrity (Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick, 
and Pollock, 2017). Related to these questions is the issue of identity change (Tripsas, 2009). While 
the sampled firms were relatively stable with regard to their identity perceptions, disruptive 
innovations might have the potential to substantially alter organizations’ identity perceptions (Anthony 
and Tripsas, 2016). Therefore, research on identities and innovation could contribute to current debates 
on the conditions under which identities change and how. 
Finally, more research is needed to explore the long-term performance implications of 
organizational identity in the context of disruptive innovations (Voss, Cable, and Voss, 2006). We 
abstracted from performance because, in our empirical setting, digitalization only recently reached the 
end of its era of ferment. It is therefore too early to determine conclusively which publishers succeeded 
or failed in their adaptation efforts. However, we see ample opportunities for studies with even longer 
timeframes to examine carefully how identity struggles play out in the long run. 
To conclude, our study offers a new perspective on the interpretive processes through which 
members of incumbent firms make sense of and respond to disruptive innovations. In so doing, it 
reiterates the importance of cognition, especially perceptions of organizational identity, in the context 
of organizational adaptation. We hope that our findings will open new areas of research for scholars 
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(in years)  
  
Books   Periodicals 
Fiction Reference 
Work- 







Rocket Book [RB]   x x         (x)   ~50 ~50 
Reader’s Finest [RF] x x               ~50 >150  
Taurus Print [TaP] x x               ~75 ~50 
Books and More [BM]   x   x           ~75 ~25 
House of Books [HoB]   x x x   x x   x ~75 >150  
Gemini & Sons [GS]     x x           ~75 >150  
Secret Books [SEB] x x           x   ~100 ~50 
TopPress [TP] x x   x     x   x ~150 >100  
Reader’s Publisher 
[RP] 
  x         x   x ~200 >150  
Peter’s Publishing 
House [PPH] 
  x   x   x     x ~250 >150  
Leo Books [LB] x x   x     x   x ~250 ~50 
Book 2020 [B20]   x         x (x)   ~400 ~50 
Libra Press [LP]   x   x     x (x)   ~500 ~100  
Superbooks [SB]   x   x     x   x ~1000 ~50 
Median                   125 75 
a Listed in order of size; company names are pseudonyms. 







Table II  Data sources 
  Interviews    Archival Documents   Additional Data 
Publishing House Count Informants   Count  
Examples of Business Publications  
and Internal Documents 
First Archival 






Rocket Book 3 CEO, editor, industry expert   4 Financial statement 1996   Yes 2 
Reader’s Finest 6 CEO, two production assistants, sales 
assistant, editor, industry expert 
  18 Internal workflows, brochures, press articles, 
financial statements 
1999   Yes 4 
Taurus Print 3 CEO, VP production, sales assistant   65 Brochures, press articles, financial statements 1998   Yes 3 
Books and More 3 CEO, VP productionb, industry expert   4 Brochures, press articles, financial statements 1998   No 0 
House of Books 4 Owner, VP sales, VP productionb, supplier   17 Brochures, press articles, financial statements 1998   Yes 0 
Gemini & Sons 3 CEO, editor, industry expert   13 Brochures, financial statements 2001   Yes 2 
Secret Books 4 CEO, VP production, VP sales, manager 
digitalizationb 
  76 Brochures, press articles, financial statements 1999   Yes 1 
TopPress 4 CEO, VP production, manager 
digitalizationb, industry expert 
  17 Press articles, financial statements, CEO interview 
with media 
1998   Yes 3 
Reader’s Publisher 5 CEO, VP purchasing, two managers, editor   59 Press articles, financial statements 1998   No 3 
Peter’s Publishing 
House 
7 CEO, two production assistantsb, sales 
assistant, head of work council, editor, 
industry expert 
  39 Company chronicle, internal organization charts, 
press articles, brochures, financial statements, 
CEO interview with media 
1996   No 4 
Leo Books 8 CEO, manager digitalizationb, editor, two 
sales assistants, executive assistant, 
product owner, industry expert 
  17 Brochures, financial statements, CEO interview with 
media 
1999   No 2 
Book 2020 5 Owner, CEO, head of online marketing, 
manager online marketing, industry expert 
  47 Brochures, press articles, financial statements, CEO 
interview with media 
1999   No 1 
Libra Press 4 CEO, VP productionb, editor, industry 
expert 
  33 Company chronicle, internal organization charts, 
press articles, brochures, financial statements 
1996   No 2 
Superbooks 4 CEO, product ownerb, project team 
member, industry expert 
  84 Press articles, financial statements 1996   Yes 0 
Not case specificc 7 Two founders of new entrants, five industry 
experts 
  41 Academic books on the publishing industry, 
newspaper articles, blogs, webpages, market 
research studies 
n.a.   n.a. n.a. 
Total 70   534    8 27 
a: Historical websites were retrieved in two-year steps. b: Responsible for digital products. c: Focus on general issues concerning the response of publishers to digitalization. d: Number of 
interviews that included a systematic, structured questionnaire used to triangulate the data. 
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Since resolution of identity-related struggle flexible and intensive activities with regard to 
digitalization: Several award winning apps, e-books, databases and complex, tailored 














11 Since resolution of identity-related struggle flexible and intensive activities with regard to 
digitalization: For instance, launch of a broad variety of digital products, including 












4 Since resolution of identity-related struggle, flexible activities with regard to digitalization. For 
instance, launched selected, innovative, and award-winning mobile apps and databases. 







No Quick innovative domain 
defense responses 
1 Strong focus on print. Launched activities to strengthen print market share, e.g., by 







No Quick innovative domain 
defense responses 








No Quick innovative domain 
defense responses  
1 Strong focus on print. Attempts to strengthen print market share through incremental 









Ongoing inertia, hesitant 
rigid adoption 
1 Perceives ongoing struggle. Recently launched a limited number of digital products, mostly 









Ongoing inertia, hesitant 
rigid adoption 
1 Perceives ongoing struggle. Restricts own digital activities to online sales of physical books 







No Quick, aggressive, but 
somewhat rigid adoption 
5 Intensive activities with regard to digitalization, thereby following suggestions made by 







No Quick, aggressive, but 
somewhat rigid adoption 
 
4 Intensive activities with regard to digitalization. Acquired several IT companies and now 





No Quick, aggressive, but 
somewhat rigid adoption 










Ongoing inertia, hesitant 
rigid adoption 
3 Disagreement across hierarchical levels whether digital products challenge or enhance 
domain identity, thus no firm-level response but several smaller adoption activities driven 
by departments. For instance, as a reaction to the demands of some customers, launch of 










Ongoing inertia, hesitant 
rigid adoption 
3 Disagreement across hierarchical levels whether digital products challenge or enhance 
domain identity, thus no firm-level response but several smaller adoption activities driven 
by departments. None of those few activities related to the core business. Most digital 














9 Early activities in digital publishing. However, struggle arose when role identity changed 
from follower to shaper. Afterwards, even more innovative activities with regard to 
digitalization such as online, interactive learning platforms, e-books and online books, 
online and video trainings. Innovations of product features (e.g., interactive web 
platforms), distribution channels, pricing, and product packages. 
a: Case described extensively in main manuscript. b: Count based on information provided in interviews and current webpages. Count excludes CD-ROMs and use of the internet as a direct sales 
channel for books (as compared to the distribution of digital content). c: chall. = challenged; enh. = enhanced. 
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i Throughout the interviews we were conscious of the potential limitation, or retrospective bias, that arises when one asks a person to 
reflect on why they ignored or deferred response to disruption in hindsight. The problem is that, by definition, it is not easy to see 
disruptions occurring ex ante (Klenner et al., 2013; Nelson and Winter, 1977). As a consequence, firms easily conduct an error by 
omitting a disruptive innovation that later pans out (“false negative”) or commit to an innovation that afterwards turns out to fail 
(“false positive;” see Garud, Nayyar, and Shapira, 1997). To address this important limitation, we ensured that our questions and the 
subsequent conversations with the respondents were by no means judgmental in a sense that a quick and fundamental adoption of the 
disruptive technology was the superior or “right” reaction whereas other responses were inferior or “wrong.” We also used 
triangulation to minimize such hindsight bias. 
ii E.g., in the mid to late 1990s, some publishers supplemented their physical books with CDs glued to the back covers. 
Interestingly, one coder interpreted this action as adoption of the discontinuity because those publishers had evidently 
recognized and used the technology, while the other coders viewed this action as non-adoption targeted at defending the 
printed domain. After an in-depth conversation among the coders, we decided to code such activities as “cramming,” a 
“routine rigid” (Gilbert, 2005) type of adoption, in line with the literature (Christensen and Raynor, 2003).  
iii All data—archival and interview-anecdotal—indicate that these perceptions were considerably stable over the period of 
observation. Interestingly, Leo Books’ members shared strong shaper identity perceptions even though the company had 
never been the market leader in terms of market power (e.g., market share). 
iv Taurus Print remains a leading innovator in the printed-book domain. For example, in 2016, the company introduced an 
innovation in its (printed) catalogue of new book releases—a particularly innovative form of paper (top manager, interview 
with press). 
v This resulted not only in intense intra-organizational discussions but also in the initiation of cautious, non-orchestrated 
activities by several departments in solo effort. 
vi In one company, Books and More, we observed a change in role identity perceptions from that of a follower to that of a 
shaper. According to our interview partners, perceptions of the organization’s role changed when a major merger took place 
around 2003. Please see also the respective part in the discussion section.  
 
Table A-I Dimensions, Themes, Categories, and Quotations 
Overarching Dimensions (bold text), 
2nd Order Themes (italics text),  
1st Order Categories (standard text) 
Representative Quotations  
I. Perceptions of domain identity during emergence of disruptive innovation 
1. Narrow set of product-market identity attributes 
A. Identity is tied to print  A1. [Reader’s Finest] is very book-affine. We like the haptics. We like the smell. We like the 
sound [of turning pages] (employee, RF) 
A2. [Our customers] are people who enjoy reading books [made of paper], not nerds surfing 
on the Internet (CEO, TaP) 
A3. [The core of Taurus Print is] the print medium per se […] We have always enjoyed 
creating beautiful books—and we will continue to do so (manager, TaP) 
B. Identity tied to historical capability 
portfolio  
B1. One important part of our philosophy is to keep our hands off activities, which we are not 
capable of doing (CEO, RB) 
B2. [Our] core competencies are related to the history and the established products of [B20] 
(website, B20, 2002) 
B3. One of our guiding principles is: ‘Cobbler, stick to your trade’ (middle manager, GS) 
2. Broad set of product-market identity attributes 
C. Identity is holistic C1. At [Superbooks], there are hardly any limits to the multitude of media and services (job 
offer, SB, 2006) 
C2. [BM provides] the entire spectrum (brochure, BM, 2006) 
C3. [We are a] holistic [provider of] products and services (brochure, LB, 2004) 
D. Identity as a media-independent 
provider of service / content / knowledge / 
information  
D1. [Our] mission [is] to provide content (websites, BM, 2000) 
D2. We see ourselves as a content provider, we are not a publishing house. [...] We are not 
the Gutenbergs (production manager, SEB) 
3. Narrow definition of domain identity 
E. Competitors are a restricted set of 
incumbents 
E1. We are among the 10 strongest publishers in our sector. We consider the other nine 
publishers as our main competitors (CEO, RF) 
E2. Our competitors are [three established companies] (CEO, RP) 
F. Players from other contexts are not 
important 
F1. Observing businesses from other sectors or startups is not at all important because they 
first have to become established (CEO, RF) 
4. Broad definition of domain identity 
G. Anyone is a competitor G1. [A competitor is] anyone that deals with the same topics as we do (CEO, SEB) 
G2. Competitors are broadly defined (CEO, TP) 
H. Our competitive field is diverse and 
includes non-publishers  
H1. Some of our competitors are, of course, classical publishing houses. However, new 
competitors, especially content mediators, such as Google, Xing, Internet newsgroups, and 
even industry fairs, have become even more important (CEO, LP) 
H2. [competitors] range from established publishers to small technology startups (manager 
responsible for electronic sales, SEB) 
II. Perception of disruptive innovation and its adoption as enhancing or challenging domain identity  
5. Digitalization challenges domain identity 
I. Digitalization is outside the scope of our 
historically grown competencies  
I1. We know exactly what we are good at. [And digitalization does not match our capabilities 
…] (CEO, RB) 
I2. You simply cannot digitalize everything. […] We are dinosaurs in this regard. [Our] print 
products are of high quality, and highly respected in the market. They are the flagship of the 
organization, they made the organization big (CEO, TaP) 
J. Digitalization is outside our home turf 
because it is inappropriate to satisfy our 
customers’ needs 
J1. [Digitalization does not belong to our field because] electronic media are inappropriate for 
any advanced reading. [...] I think print is much more appropriate for this (CEO, RP) 
J2. I think that the haptic of paper cannot be replaced (CEO, RF) 
 
6. Digitalization enhances identity domain 
K. Digitalization matches our open self 
definition 
K1. [Of course digitalization fits us because] we do not feel obliged to [continue printing 
books—in fact we even] don’t feel obliged to produce content. We always feel free to say: 
Let’s build and run a school? Or: Let’s start consulting! (CEO, BM) 
K2. [Digitalization affects us because] we at [PPH] are very open with regard to the products 
[that we produce] (production manager, PPH) 
K3. [Digitalization fits us because] the medium is not important (CEO, TP) 
L. Digitalization is a liberation from 
constraints posed by print to convey 
content 
L1. Prior to digitalization we did not have any other medium to convey our content. [...] 
When the publisher was established, the only way to mediate and transfer information to 
customers was in print (CEO, SB) 
L2. We sell information to target customers. […] In the pre-electronic era, we had no other 
media at hand to fulfill this task (CEO, SB) 
III. Emerging awareness of organizational role identity amid disruptive innovation 
7. Emerging organizational role identity as a shaper  
M. We are special M1. No one else puts as much effort in details as we do. [...] Who else is investing in such 
things nowadays? Who else invests in building up so much knowledge as we do? (CEO, RB) 
M2. [We are different because] we work a lot based on ideology here. We choose an 
approach and we will accept certain sacrifices (assistant, PPH) 
M3. We might just be the most renowned publishing house of the post-war era (CEO, TaP) 
N. Being leader and shaper is core to us N1. We are a company that strives to advance the world’s knowledge […] with a focus on 
quality and content (manager, BM) 
N2. We shape the 21st century’s literature (website, 2004, BM) 
N3. We see ourselves as “advancer” (assistant, PPH) 
N4. We want to decide on our own what to do and what is right for our customers (CEO, LB) 
O. Innovation and motivation come from 
inside the company 
O1. It comes from within us. We want to sweat blood and tears but also to experience the joy 
of offering products to our customers. It really is a matter of the heart (sales employee, RF) 
O2. To the members of our firm it is very important WHAT they do. It is not as sales-
oriented as in other firms, it comes more from the inside (CEO, BM) 
O3. While other publishing houses say ‘okay, we are a service provider, we want to be on it,’ 
we are not like that. We work on it internally and try to optimize everything before launching 
it (employee, TaP) 
P. We are an independent actor P1. What characterizes us is that we are very independent. We are actually completely 
independent […] we are not the slaves (CEO, RB) 
P2. To remain self-contained [is our] ultimate goal (CEO, LB) 
8. Emerging organizational role identity as a follower  
Q. We are not shapers (explicit statements) Q1. Our firm is like a ship with no final destination. We just move, and we have to make sure 
we neither move too fast nor too slow (CEO, TP) 
Q2. We do not have a role as a pioneer. We are not drivers of the market (manager, RP) 
R. External environment determines our 
direction, even if this counters economic 
logic 
R1. We do not have a core product. We have target customers whom we serve. […] We have 
to ask ourselves: What does the customer group require? (manager, TP) 
R2. The market dictates the terms. […] We do what the customer wants [us] to do (CEO, GS) 
R3. When something new happens, we have to react. When the customers decide that they 
need new product innovations, then we have to react (middle manager, GS) 
S. Serving is at the core of thinking and 
acting / we are good at serving 
S1. […] it’s the proximity to customers that really characterizes us and makes us special. 
(production manager, HoB) 
S2. [Our] mission and capabilities are those of a “servant” (chief editor, GS) 
IV. Perception of conceivable solutions as either enhancing or challenging emerging organizational role identity 
9. Conceivable solutions enhance organizational role identity 
T. It’s our role to follow the market—and 
the market wants digital products 
T1. CEO’s initial reaction to digitalization according to sales manager: “I do not know 
anything about it. But let’s do it.” (TP) 
U. Continuing printed books allows us to 
continue shaping our environment / no 
junk to survive 
U1. Our standards have to remain the same. In that regard, we are absolutely 
uncompromising […]. We will not produce junk just to survive. (CEO, TaP)  
U2. We will see who will die and who will survive. […] we are ready to fight. (CEO, TaP) 
U3. We put huge effort into optimizing the layout for our books. And in the end, everything 
should just be an electronic file? No, that hurts. [That is, we will continue with printed books] 
(production manager, RF) 
10. Conceivable solutions challenge organizational role identity 
V. Would love to go digital, but it’s 
challenging as we won’t be the shapers 
anymore 
V1. [If we fully invest in digitalization], we endeavor to play an active role among the 
industry leaders (CEO, PPH) 
V2. [We did not feel threatened economically. Rather, it was] the fear of failure—our culture 
of perceiving ourselves as the best—that made us afraid that we would be unable to measure 
up to the standard of our own expectations. In the field of new media, we were unlikely to be 
as successful as in our established business (CEO, LB) 
V3. When new markets are opening, then we have to evaluate whether and how we [as 
shapers] fit in (manager, BM)  
W. Digitalization is not who we are; but 
we should go digital because the market 
wants us to 
W1. If [digitalization and social media are] important for our customers, then we have to 
adopt them. However, I am quite hesitant. Most organization members of [Reader’s 
Publisher, including myself] would prefer to only be involved in print (CEO, RP) 
W2. Where do we come from? Who are we? Where do we want to go? [Shall we] frivolously 
follow whims and current consulting trends? (CEO, GS, 2005) 
W3. We now have to deal with demands that are initially virulent and do not fall within our 
business area. I would prefer a world in which product digitalization did not exist […] 
digitalization is a plague—but we cannot avoid it (CEO, GS)  
V. Organizational paralysis amid ongoing identity struggle 
11. Protracted decision making due to ongoing identity struggle  
X. Discussions take long because 
“Digitalization yes, but not in a way we 
are not shapers anymore” 
X1. [Digitalization] is difficult. It is still very difficult [...] Of course, what we could offer is 
very general information put online for download. [...] However, [developing more advanced 
digital products] is a process that needs more time. Of course, we will go there. [...] We have 
to develop new concepts from scratch. [...] We have a very positive attitude towards 
digitalization—I was just very upset when I observed the first tentative attempts of other 
publishers, which were not based on advanced business models. (production manager, SEB) 
X2. […] we sometimes stand in our way because we always discuss how new [digital] 
products would fit us [as leaders] (production manager, SEB) 
X3. Everyone wanted it [i.e., embracing digitalization], [… but] there were many discussions. 
It was a struggle. [However,] we do not just want to be a player in the market. We want to 
offer unique value (manager, LB) 
Y. Returning discussions around perceived 
need for taking conscious decision worthy 
of shaper 
Y1. One of the biggest difficulties is that we need to know what we want. And that we 
identify how we can contribute real value to the value chain (CEO, PPH) 
Y2. [Again and again,] we discussed how we want to present ourselves [with respect to 
digital products] and took a conscious decision (sales manager, SEB) 
12. Passive responses and “ego-defenses” 
Z. Frustration that print-focus is contested 
by perceived pressure to digitalize 
products 
Z1. Our core products are our print products, but they will certainly have a tough time in the 
future with many fights (member of marketing department, B20) 
Z2. Digitalization has been a huge challenge to us. […] The biggest problem was that we did 
not have a real product anymore. We just had a lot of information burnt on a CD. […] We 
could not see how this should be a product (sales manager, HoB) 
Z3. Getting older makes our company a stranger in its own field. This publishing house, that 
celebrates an anniversary this year, is a phase-out model. The printed book will not maintain 
its dominant role as information medium in the cultural life (CEO, GS) 
AA. Frustration about difficulties to find 
shaper-solution with digitalization 
AA1. No one can force us to produce specific products. I always tell my colleagues: If 
someone tells you to produce certain products, e.g., apps, and in a certain way, then leave it. 
Do something else. Adaptation to digitalization yes, but normal e-books are as dull as 
ditchwater. There is nothing innovative about it (CEO, PPH) 
VI. Internally focused activities during struggle and settlement 
13. Restriction of digitalization activities  
AB. Products rejected because they don’t 
fit us as shapers 
AB1. Our company is very selective as to which products are digital (manager, SEB) 
AC. Digital products, only to somehow 
follow market needs  
AC1. To satisfy the trends, we launched the first electronic product [i.e. a CD-ROM] 
(archival website, B20) 
14. Internal search for solutions that enhance domain-identity-driven and role-identity-driven interpretation 
AD. Active search for solutions that 
exceed the “standard”  
AD1. We haven’t launched digital versions of this [specific] product yet. We work full 
stretch on this project. Now, we finally have some very good ideas about what to do. This 
will exceed a pure online version of those products, because this would be nothing new. […] 
In any case that will be something that the publishing sector has not seen before (CEO, SEB) 
AD2. [We were searching for a] holistic solution […] that allowed [us] to offer value to the 
customers and […] thus went beyond the competitors’ offerings (CEO, LB) 
AE. Top management encourages 
employees to develop ideas on how to find 
AE1. The top management asked us to come up with solution proposals [for digitalization] 
(production manager, PPH). 
“internal” solutions AE2. Then we started to think what else we could do and how we could use our strengths to 
develop [digital] products (CEO, BM) 
AF. Failing attempts to broaden domain 
identity perceptions to embrace 
digitalization 
AF1. Digitalization of books is easy. It is associated with technical problems that are all 
solvable. What is challenging is that we want to use the new media to provide really new 
forms of content [and thus continue to be someone that advances the world] (manager, SB) 
15. Beginning settlement of struggle 
AG. Decision to go into products that are 
ahead of the market (even customer 
expectations)  
AG1. We will not produce classic e-books. Reading books as e-books is boring. Especially 
when it’s black and white and without color. What is interesting is offering real applications 
(sales manager, SEB) 
AH. Increasing internal momentum after 
perceived breakthrough, supported by 
management communication 
AH1. When [digitalization] started several years ago we were excited about digitalization. 
But we were not prepared yet. Then we started to doubt [about how digitalization could be 
meaningfully implemented]. But now it is part of our daily job (sales manager, PPH) 
VII. Decision making under consistent domain-identity driven and role-identity-driven interpretation 
16. Decision making uncontestedly revolves around adoptive responses 
AI. Quick decisions for launches of digital 
products 
AI1. When digitalization came up, we asked our suppliers to provide us with digital products. 
That wasn’t any turmoil at all. That was just starting first initiatives and entering the market 
(CEO, SB) 
AI2. Quick decision, as role of TP is to “offer products and services to the target customers. 
[…] New things will be added, other things will be abandoned” (manager, TP) 
AJ. Hurdles in decision making removed 
proactively 
AJ1. Sometimes problems occur. Then one stops and recognizes: oh there is a wall! And then 
you have to choose another way that goes past the wall (CEO, TP) 
17. Decision making uncontestedly revolves around non-adoptive responses 
AK. Unanimous abstinence from adoption: 
it’s us who decide what we can and want  
AK1. At RB, we do what we are capable of and what we like to do—that is what makes our 
firm so great and what I like about it (CEO, RB) 
AK2. [At TaP, we decided to continue producing] pretty, formidable books that we like to 
exhibit and sell in book shops (senior sales manager, TaP) 
AL. Emerging view of digitalization as a 
bolster to print 
AL1. We discussed among the TMT whether we should develop and sell e-books. We were 
very hesitant, consciously hesitant. […] Maybe our books will become more precious, more 
expensive in the future, targeted at book connoisseurs (CEO, RF) 
VIII. Responses within the old domain 
18. Activities to increase the revenues generated by print business 
AM. Incremental product innovation in 
print 
AM1. Lighter books (TaP) 
AM2. Additional entertainment elements in print books such as riddles (RF) 
AM3. New and refined editions of classic books and mix of genres (RF) 
AN. Expansion of targeted print markets  AN1. Broadening of product portfolio by increasing the number of topics the publisher’s 
books focus on (TaP; RB) 
AN2. Activities to sell print products internationally (RB) 
AO. Intensified promotion of print 
products 
AO1. Use of digital products, e.g., DVDs, (as “free goodies”) to support sales of print 
products (RF; RP) 
AO2. How we see it and how we communicate it: Only if you buy the print product, you also 
get access to the online product (sales manager, HoB) 
AO3. New sales channels, e.g., online shop to support print products sales (B20; RF) 
19. (Partial) exit from print domain 
AP. Divestiture of parts of the print 
business 
AP1. Substantial parts of print portfolio have been divested over the last years (SB) 
AP2. Sales of printing press in 2005 (LP) 






AQ1. Layoffs of employees with print-specific skills (PPH; B20) 
IX. Responses within the new domain  
20. Flexible entry into digital publishing 
AR. Launch of innovative, electronic-only 
products 
AR1. Apps based on newly developed databases (SEB) 
AR2. Launch of electronic journals without print equivalent (PPH) 
AR3. Interactive books which allow communication between author and reader (BM) 
AR4. Social-network software and advanced search engine (LB) 
AS. Digitalization (and adaptation) of core 
products 
AS1. Flagship product digital and adapted to needs of customers using the digital version 
(PPH) 
AS2. Digital publishing centered around former core print products that were digital and 
substantially adapted (BM) 
AT. Tailored sales channels for digital 
products 
AT1. Web platforms and shops that particularly promote sales of digital products (SEB) 
AT2. Intense promotion of digital products, for instance on publisher’s website (LB) 
AU. New revenue models for digital 
products 
AU1. Sales of book chapters instead of entire books (PPH)  
AU2. Sophisticated pricing models for customers that use interactive online platforms (BM) 
AU3. Pay-per-view instead of purchase-of-text (PPH) 
AV. Digitalization supported by members 
with respective skills/experience  
AV1. Hiring of experienced managers (SEB)  
AV2. Digitalization skills as part of the job description (BM) 
21. Aggressive entry into digital publishing 
AW. Digitalization of most print products AW1. All print products, including backlist, digital (PPH) 
AW2. Large number of electronic (relative to print) products (BM) 
AX. Acquisition of companies associated 
with digitalization 
AX1. Acquisition of software developing house (SB) 
AX2. Acquisition of online portal (RP; SB) 
AY. Dedication of large amount of 
manpower to digital publishing  
AY1. New department founded (LB; PPH) 
AY2. New managers and employees hired (SB; PPH; SEB) 
AY3. Several millions of EUR invested into hiring (LP) 
22. Inflexible entry into digital publishing 
AZ. Conversion of print to digital products 
without adaptation 
AZ1. In most cases we still just recycle the book and put it online (operations manager, SB) 
AZ2. Most products are converts of print products to pdfs instead of new products (according 
to sales manager of TP) 
AZ3. No native digital content generated (RP) 
AZ4. A majority of online content [of LP] was reused print content (employee, LP) 
BA. Lack of generation of native digital 
content 
BA1. No native digital content generated (RP; TP) 
BA2. [We] lacked entrepreneurial spirit […] for [native digital] products (editor, LP) 
23. Cautious entry into digital publishing 
BB. Launch of only few digital products BB1. Firm-level decision that digitalization of entire portfolio is unnecessary (TP) 
BB2. Decision not to offer any apps, e-books, or online books (SB) 
BB3. Low number of digital products, no e-books or online books (HoB) 
BC. Entry into digital publishing based on 
existing resources with no new staff hired 
BC1. Any digital activities based on existing staff (RP) 
 
Legend: B20: Book 2020; BM: Books and More; GS: Gemini & Sons; HoB: House of Books; LB: Leo Books; LP: Libra Press; PPH: 
Peter‘s Publishing House; RB: Rocket Book; RF: Reader‘s Finest; RP: Reader‘s Publisher; SB: Superbooks; SEB: Secret Books; TaP: 
Taurus Print; TP: TopPress.  
  
Table A-II Evidence per case 
 Domain Identity Role Identity Struggles Organizational Responses 
1. Leo Books [LB] Domain identity enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• Embracing the new digital 
technologies was “an almost 
self-evident consequence [of 
the company’s] holistic 
[world view].” (“About Us,” 
website of Leo Books, 1999) 
• Leo Books has always 
essentially been “[a provider 
of] information and 
knowledge [and] not only 
printed papers.” (“About Us,” 
Leo Books website, 2001; 
similar statement found in 
2004 company brochure) 
Role as shaper challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• Leo Books’ identity rested 
strongly on perceptions of 
“autonomy” and 
“independence” in its strategic 
decisions. (“About us” website 
of Leo Books, mission 
statement of Leo Books) 
• “We do not just want to be a 
player in the market. We want 
to offer unique value.” 
(manager) 
• “We want to decide on our own 
what to do and what is right for 
our customers [instead of 
following what Google and 
Amazon tell us to do. … We 
prefer initiatives] created from 
the inside. To remain self-






• “[We did not feel threatened 
economically. Rather, it was] the 
fear of failure—our culture of 
perceiving ourselves as the 
best—that made us afraid that we 
would be unable to measure up to 
the standard of our own 
expectations.” (CEO) 
•  “[We were] intensively 
searching for a comprehensive 
and sustainable solution […]. 
Unlike other publishing houses, 
we did not want to start with 
smaller, individual projects.” 
(manager) 
• “[Our] philosophy is to offer not 
only the highest-quality content 
but also the best technological 
solutions.” (employee) 
• “[We could not find a] holistic 
solution […] that […] went 
beyond our competitors’ 
offerings.” (CEO) 
Highly innovative adoption 
 
 
• Leo Books realized at that time that 
a previously developed database 
(that had actually been a pet project 
driven relatively long ago by a 
long-tenured employee) was useful 
as a basis for digitizing the 
company’s products. This 
proprietary database was to become 
the “linchpin of [Leo Books’] 
digital product portfolio.” (website 
of Leo Books, 2013) 
• “When you have your own ideas 
that are fundamentally different 
from your competitors’ ideas, then 
you have to give them a shot.” 
(manager) 
• “As in the past, we see ourselves as 
leaders in our market. With our 
digitized product, we set totally 
new standards in the area of 
digitized databases in our field.” 
(website of Leo Books, 2006) 
• Leo Books has won numerous 
innovation prizes for its digitized 
products. 
2. Taurus Print 
[TaP] 
Domain identity challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “We have always enjoyed 
creating beautiful books – and 
we will continue to do so.” 
(top manager, interview with 
Role as shaper challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• Taurus Print is “the most 
renowned publishing house of 
the post-war era in our 
segment.” (CEO, interview) 
No struggles observed Non-adoption, but highly innovative 
domain defense 
 
• The management quickly and 
unanimously decided to “continue 
to produce books as we have done 
in the past.” (employee) 
press)  
• “[Our identity focuses on] 
producing pretty, formidable 
books that we like to exhibit 
and sell in book shops.” 
(employee) 
• The core of Taurus Print is 
“the print medium per se.” 
(manager) 
• “[our customers] are people 
who enjoy reading books 
[made of paper], not nerds 
surfing on the Internet.” 
(CEO) 
• Taurus Print had always 
assumed the role of a clear 
“leader [that] created its core 
market—there was nothing like 
that before.” (manager)   
• “Other publishing houses say 
‘Okay, we are a service 
provider—we want to be on it.’ 
We are not like that. We work on 
issues internally and try to 
optimize everything before 
launching them.” (employee) 
• “We are dinosaurs in that 
regard. […] We will see who 
will die and who will survive. 
However, we are ready to 
fight.” (CEO) 
• The CEO confirmed in his 
interview with us that he just does 
not “believe in any digital business 
models for [Taurus Print]” and, as 
such, believed that “not much will 
change in the future.” 
• Around the year 2000, Taurus Print 
invested substantial money and 
human capital into the further 
development of “pretty, high-
quality books that are sold via 
bookshops.” (senior sales manager) 
• Several of the books published by 
Taurus Print received national 
design awards in the 2000-2010 
period (website, press releases). 
3. Gemini & Sons 
[GS] 
Domain identity challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• Members of this organization 
perceived the commitment to 
the “graphic design of books” 
and the “development of 
[printed] books - from the 
acquisition of authors to 
sales” as being at the core of 
the company’s identity 
(company website, About Us, 
2001, 2006). 
• “We publish books” [anything 
else—such as digitization—
was] “peripheral.” (manager) 
• “Our core products are printed 
books. […] We will not 
change our business in the 
coming years.” (manager) 
Role as follower enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “The market dictates the 
terms. […] We do what the 
customer wants [us] to do. 
[…] Over the more than 100 
years of our company’s 
history, we have always tried 
to keep a watchful eye on 
what is happening outside 
and to orient ourselves 
towards the large 
competitors.” (CEO) 
• “When something new 
happens, we have to react.  
When the customers decide 
that they need new product 
innovations, then we have to 






• “Where do we come from? Who 
are we?  Where do we want to 
go?  [Shall we] frivolously follow 
whims and current consulting 
trends?” (CEO, public letter) 
• “We now have to deal with 
demands that are initially virulent 
and do not fall within our 
business area. I would prefer a 
world in which product 
digitalization does not exist. […] 
Digitization is a plague – but, 
somehow, we cannot avoid it.” 
(CEO) 
• A manager described this 
situation as “living under 
the sword of Damocles.” 
Highly tentative, rigid adoption 
 
 
• Gemini & Sons offered few 
digitized products, such as audio 
CDs and downloadable content – 
yet all of these efforts served the 
mere purpose of “support[ing] 
book sales.” (CEO, interview). 
• Gemini & Sons further narrowed 
its set of competitive benchmarks 
to focus on only three long-time 
(print book) competitors. 
•  “Getting older makes our 
company a stranger in its own 
field. This publishing house ... is a 
phase-out model.” (CEO, public 
speech) 
 
4. Libra Press 
[LP] 
Domain identity enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• Already in 1991, the CEO 
highlighted “the rise of 
digitalization” in a speech to 
other publishers. 
• Libra Press is described as 
being a provider of 
“knowledge transfer that is 
relevant to practice” without 
any specific reference to 
“books” or “printed products” 
(website of Libra press, early 
1990s). 
• “We serve society through 
providing information in the 
form of print and electronic 
media.” (company website, 
1996) 
• “Some of our competitors are, 
of course, classical publishing 
houses.  However, new 
competitors, especially 
content mediators, such as 
Google, Xing, Internet 
newsgroups, and even 
industry fairs, have become 
even more important.” (CEO) 
Role as follower enhanced by 
disruptive innovation   
 
• The role of Libra Press is 
“serving society” (website of 
Libra Press, “about us,” since 
1996) with a “focus on 
satisfying customers.” (website 
of Libra Press, since 2002) 
• “The market required changes.” 
(production manager) 
No struggles observed Aggressive, somewhat rigid adoption 
 
 
• “The top management proposed 
‘Let’s do that!’ and the then-89-
year old owner […] said: ‘That’s 
an opportunity!’ And then we 
invested a two digit million EUR 
amount.” (CEO) 
• “When the dot-com bubble burst, 
we stopped all [digitalization-
related] activities […]. We only 
restarted in 2006 – we did so in a 
very powerful way. That means, 
we invested lots of money.” (CEO)  
• Most of Libra Press’ digitized 
products merely copied existing 
products of competitors (manager).  
• “A majority of our online content 
was reused print content.” 
(employee) 
• [There is a] lack of “killer 
applications.” (employee) 
• “[We] lacked entrepreneurial spirit 







Domain identity enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• PPH perceives itself as a 
“service provider [that] 
combines advantages of 
traditional books and 
multimedia concepts.” 
(website, 2004) 
Role as shaper challenged by 
disruptive innovation   
 
• “We want to be very proactive 
and offer something new and 
valuable.” (production 
manager) 





• “One of the biggest difficulties is 
that we need to know what we 
want. And that we identify how 
we can contribute real value to 
the value chain.” (CEO) 
• “The top management asked us to 
Highly innovative adoption 
 
 
• Launch of innovative electronic –
only products: 2006: first smartphone 
application; 2008: new web portals, 
new online services; also offers 
journals and data bases without a 
print equivalent. 
• “We are a … publisher, 
internationally active, that 
develops and sells content in 
any technical form.” (CEO 
when he aimed to describe his 
company in one sentence) 
• “[Digitization affects us 
because] we at [PPH] are very 
open with regard to the 
products [that we produce].” 
(production manager) 
• “When talking about books, 
we do not distinguish between 
print and electronic books. 
They appear as the same for 
us.” (CEO) 
• “Sometimes—but on rare 
occasions—we say: They are 
all crazy, we’ll do it the way we 
like and make decisions 
contrary to the customer 
demands.” (CEO) 
• “We always have to ask 
ourselves: Does that fit us?” 
(CEO)  
• “No one can force us to 
produce specific products. I 
always tell my colleagues: If 
someone tells you to produce 
certain products, e.g., apps, and 
in a certain way, then leave it. 
Do something else.” (CEO) 
• “[We had to] endeavor to play 
an active role among the 
industry leaders [but that was 
difficult because] normal e-
books are as dull as dishwater. 
There is nothing innovative 
about them.” (CEO) 
come up with solution proposals 
[for digitization].” (production 
manager)  
• “There was a strong sense of 
uncertainty and even anxiety at 
PPH. ... We conducted 
workshops [based on digitization] 
and surveyed the employees. 
Finally, I think we succeeded 
quite well.” (production 
manager) 
• “When [digitization] started 
several years ago we were 
excited about digitization. But we 
were not prepared yet. Then we 
started to doubt [about how 
digitization could be 
meaningfully implemented]. But 
now it is part of our daily job.” 
(sales manager) 
• Dedication of large amount of 
manpower to digitized publishing: 
1996: two employees solely 
responsible for electronic products 
(newly hired in the 1990s); in 
beginning of 2000s: online unit with 
several employees founded. 
6. Secret Books 
[SEB] 
Domain identity enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “We see ourselves as a 
content provider, we are not a 
publishing house. ... We are 
not the Gutenbergs.” 
(production manager, three 
times repeated in the 
interview) 
• “[Competitors] range from 
established  publishers to 
small technology startups.” 
(manager responsible for 
electronic sales) 
Role as shaper challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “We do not invest in any 
commercial activities, 
regardless of the medium, that 
do not suit us. For instance, we 
would not launch an internet 
platform related to cooking just 
because we could earn money 
with it. [...] We only do things 
that suit us.” (CEO) 
• “We invest much time and 
effort in order to continue 




• “[Digitization] is difficult. It is 
still very difficult ... Of course, 
what we could offer is very 
general information put online 
for download.... However, 
[developing more advanced 
digitized products] is a process 
that needs more time. Of course, 
we will go there. ... We have to 
develop new concepts from 
scratch. ... We have a very 
positive attitude towards 
digitization—I was just very 
Highly innovative adoption 
 
 
• Award-winning DVD; two internet 
portals, web-based TV channel 
(archival websites). 
• In 2009/2011: first apps (among 
three top-selling apps in Germany 
for several months). 
• Continuous: Creation and 
development of online database. 
• “We have launched several really 
novel products. Very nice going. ... 
I am somewhat proud of it.” (CEO) 
• “[Digitization seen as inside 
SEB’s domain since] SEB is 
an innovative publisher, 
characterized by openness.” 
(sales manager) 
last 20% [of quality] are most 
expensive and customers do not 
pay for it. But we place value 
on it.” (CEO) 
• “We aim to offer products, 
which the industry sectors have 
not seen before [and we are 
reluctant to introduce any new 
electronic products that are] 
nothing new.” (CEO). 
upset when I observed the first 
tentative attempts of other 
publishers, which were not based 
on advanced business models.” 
(production manager) 
• “When deciding which new 
digitized products to offer, we 
sometimes stand in our own way 
because we always discuss how 
new products would fit us [as 
shapers].” (production manager) 
7. Rocket Book 
[RB] 
Domain identity challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “The core product of [RB] is 
the [printed] book - supported 
by other media” (CEO) 
• “One important part of our 
philosophy is to keep our 
hands off activities which we 
are not capable of doing.” 
(CEO) 
• “We know exactly what we 
are good at. [And digitization 
does not match our 
capabilities].” (CEO) 
Role as shaper challenged by 
disruptive innovation  
 
• “What characterizes us is that 
we are very independent. We 
are actually completely 
independent.” (CEO) 
• “We are active in a small 
market, but we are not the 
slaves [of customers and 
competitors].” (CEO) 
• “Who else invests in building 
up so much knowledge as we 
do? ... It is only us who have 
built up this stock of 
knowledge, because, to say it 
bluntly, we are so ‘stupid’ to 
care about this level of detail. 
No one else wants to do it, 
because it requires so much 
effort.” (CEO) 
• RB has a focus on “high 
quality, good value” and desires 
to offer a “concentrate of the 
best” by engaging the “best 
authors” (website statements) 
and thus being “creative and 
innovative.” (press release, 
No struggles observed Non-adoption, but innovative domain 
defense 
 
• Continuous effort to modernize the 
layout and optimize the “look-and-
feel” of print products (CEO) 
• Substantial broadening of print 
product portfolio in 2007, 2009, 
and 2010; geographic expansion 
(internationally) via licensing. 
2004) 
8. Reader’s Finest 
[RF] 
Domain identity challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “Our core products are books, 
printed books. And this won’t 
change.” (CEO) 
• “[Reader’s Finest] is very 
book-affine. We like the 
haptics. We like the smell. We 
like the sound [of turning 
pages].” (employee) 
• “I think that the touch and feel 
of paper cannot be replaced... 
[Thus, new media] will never 
be our market in the future.” 
(CEO) 
• “Such initiatives outside of 
the print business […] would 
be inconceivable for us.” 
(CEO) 
Role as shaper challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “We do not want to produce 
only books [such as soft cover 
belletrist], but we want to 
produce special books.” (sales 
manager) 
• “Independence” as one of the 
firm’s most important goals 
(website 1999). 
• “One of [Reader’s Finest] most 
important principles is to 
generate ideas internally.” 
(employee)  
No struggles observed Non-adoption, but innovative domain 
defense 
 
• Since 2004: new series of books in 
foreign language, new editions of 
“classic” books, new genres, mix 
of genres. 
• Further examples of incremental 
innovations in the old (print-based) 
domain: mentioned by CEO: jokes 
at the end of each chapter; new 
writing styles; riddles included in 
the texts. 
9. Book 2020 
[B20] 
Domain identity challenged by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “Our core products are print 
books.” (member of 
marketing department) 
• “We will concentrate on our 
core competencies [which are 
related to established print 
products].” (chronicle, 2011) 
Role as follower enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• Main goal is “to make 
customers more successful [by 
providing information and] to 
fully concentrate on the 
customers’ demands and to 
quickly react to changes.” 
(website, 2002) 
• “It is expected from each 
manager that we travel to the 
US at least once and observe 
the upcoming trends there.” 
(internet marketing manager) 




• “Our core products are our print 
products, but they will certainly 
have a tough time in the future 
with many fights.” (member of 
marketing department) 
• Decision to continue focusing 
on print products, but several 
investment to “do what is 
expected from B20.” For 
instance, as stated on website: 
“To satisfy the trends, we 
launched the first electronic 
product [i.e. a CD-ROM].”  
Highly tentative, rigid adoption 
 
 
• “We have several eBooks. They are 
all nitty-gritty, no real products.” 
(internet marketing manager) 
• “Our firm doesn’t really make 
revenues with digitized products.” 
(internet marketing manager) 
in market research [in order to 
fulfil our purpose].” (CEO) 
• “Typically, we do anything that 
needs to be done [but we want 
to continue focusing on print].” 
(internet marketing manager) 
• However: “Revenues with 
digitized products do not play a 
central role for us. ... Our core 
product is still based on print 
products.” (CEO, interview). 
10. Superbooks 
[SB] 
Domain identity enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “At Superbooks, there are 
hardly any limits to the 
multitude of media and 
services.” (job offer, 2006) 
• SB as a provider of “holistic, 
thorough, and high quality 
information.” (website, 2002) 
• “Prior to digitization, we did 
not have any other medium to 
convey our content. ... When 
the publisher was established, 
the only way to mediate and 
transfer information to 
customers was in print.” 
(CEO) 
Role as follower enhanced by 
disruptive innovation  
 
• “Concrete demands and 
requirements of our customers 
are our starting point ... and 
also [the input we get from the] 
close cooperation with 
authors.” (websites, 2001, 
2006) 
• Several measures in place to 
support this customer-centered 
view: Dedicated time to spend 
with customers every week 
mandatory for all managers; 
customer survey, focus groups, 
usability labs, congresses, large 
field crew (CEO). 
• “Our customers’ interests and 
demands are core to us.” (press 
release, 2006) 
No struggles observed Aggressive, somewhat rigid adoption 
 
 
• Several print products converted to 
digitized products, for instance 
periodicals (since 1999) or CDs 
(since 2004); “In most cases we still 
just recycle the book and put it 
online.” (operations manager) 
11. TopPress [TP] Domain identity enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “We see us as a service 
provider.” (manager) 
• Competitors are “broadly 
defined.” (CEO) 
• TP’s contacts with non-
publishing businesses seen as 
very important as they are a 
“source of information across 
Role as follower enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• “Our firm is like a ship with no 
final destination. We just move, 
and we have to make sure we 
do not move too fast or too 
slow.” (CEO) 
• “We do not have a core 
product. We have target 
customers whom we serve. […] 
No struggles observed Aggressive, somewhat rigid adoption 
 
 
• Most products are print-pdf converts 
without adaptation according to sales 
manager. 
• Only little native digitized content 
generation. Online manager: “We 
could have probably done more [with 
regard to developing novel 
products].” 
the boundaries of the 
publishing sector.” (manager) 
• “[Digitization fits our identity 
because] the medium is not 
important.” (CEO) 
We have to ask ourselves: What 
does the customer group 
require?” (online manager, 
when asked about core product) 
• CEO’s initial reaction to 
digitization according to sales 
manager: “I do not know 
anything about it. But let’s do 
it.” “Sure, our core product will 
completely change because of 
digitization. This is like with 
clothes. Clothes need to be 
warm and practical. However, 
we do not care about color and 
design and do not know how 
this will look like.” (CEO) 
• First decided to digitize the entire 
backlist in 2009, but then decided 
that it is “not necessary,” not 
required by customers and thus 
stopped in the middle. (manager) 
12. House of 
Books [HoB] 
Split between domain identity 
challenge and enhancement  
 
Top management:  
• “Traditional print business” as 
core focus. (numerous 
managers and employees) 
• Four established print 
publishers active in the same 
segment seen as main 
competitors. (sales manager) 
 
but also contrasting evidence by 
younger manager and member 
of the owning family:  
• HoB is a “publisher that offers 
any information [that the 
customer] needs.” (manager) 
Role as follower enhanced by 
disruptive innovation  
 
• “We listen carefully to what our 
customers say. And we do what 
they want us to do.” (sales 
manager) 
• “We are the biggest German 
publisher in our specific 
sector... But it is the proximity 
to customers that really 
characterizes us and makes us 
special.” (production manager) 
• “Our tradition is that we are 
obligated to the customer. This 
has been our tradition for more 
than 20 years. And due to that, 





• Disagreement across hierarchical 
levels whether digital products 
are within or outside identity 
domain, thus no firm-level 
response but several smaller 
adoption activities driven by 
departments. 
• “Initially, we did not have 
internal discussions about 
whether to digitize our print 
magazines. However, customers 
approached us with their 
respective demands. Thus we felt 
prompted to put our content 
online [for free].” (manager) 
• “Digitization has been a huge 
challenge to us. ... The biggest 
problem was that we did not have 
a real product any more, no great 
opus. We just had a lot of 
Highly tentative, rigid adoption 
 
 
• None of those few digitalization 
activities related to the core 
business.  
• Most digitized products are free, 
providing no additional revenues. 
information burnt on a CD. ... We 
couldn’t see how this should be a 
product.” (sales manager) 
13. Reader’s 
Publisher [RP] 
Split between domain identity 
challenge and enhancement  
 
Top management:  
• Print perceived as superior 
because of the many 
“advantages of print books 
[such as] haptics [and the] 
opportunity to turn the pages.” 
(CEO) 
• “I think that electronic media 
are inappropriate for any 
advanced reading. ... I think 
print is much more 
appropriate for this.” (CEO) 
 
but also contrasting evidence 
e.g., by communication 
department:  
• RP is a company that “serves 
customers media-
independently and in a target-
group oriented way [and that] 
provides any type of 
information.” (press release, 
2009) 
Role as follower enhanced by 
disruptive innovation  
 
• “We do not have a role as a 
pioneer. We are not drivers of 
the market.” (online manager) 
• “Our most important goal is to 
please our customers’ needs.” 
(manager) 
• “If our target customers expect 
something, then we [as RP] will 
do it.” (CEO) 
• “If [digitization and social 
media are] important for our 
customers, then we have to 
adopt them. However, I am 
quite hesitant. Most 
organization members of 
[Reader’s Publisher, including 
myself] would prefer to only be 




• “Around 2005, we had long 
discussions, a lot of persuading 
was required. Because 
organization members thought: 
"We do that in print and then we 
see what else we can make out of 
it.” Today we have a different 
understanding of digitized 
products but this process is still 
ongoing, we haven’t finished it 
yet. ...  Even today, work at RP 
doesn’t run smoothly when it 
comes to digitized products.” 
(manager) 
• “Product digitization is a curse. 
But I can’t complain about it 
every day, we can’t change it any 
more.” (CEO) 
Highly tentative, rigid adoption 
 
 
• No digitization in core business. 
• According to Editor some 
“cramming” activities, e.g., free 
software. 
• No native digitized products created. 
 
14. Books and 
More [BM] 
Domain identity enhanced by 
disruptive innovation 
 
• BM’s mission is to “provide 
content.” (website, 1990s)  
• “Not the medium matters but 
the content.” (website, 1998) 
Until 2003: Role as a follower 
enhanced by disruptive innovation 
 




From 2003: Role as a shaper 





• In the beginning, no struggle, just 
launch of first electronic 
products. This was described by 
CEO as “we are there” move. 
• “Digitization of books is easy. It 
is associated with technical 
Highly innovative adoption 
 
 
• Around 2000s: Launch of 
digitized electronic books. 
• 2004: launch of (premium) e-
books with interactive 
supplementary material. 
• 2011: software, computer 
 
• “We shape the 21st century’s 
literature.” (website, 2004) 
• “Most of our new ideas come 
from the employees. ... We owe 
success to our employees that 
are granted space for pioneering 
spirit.” (manager) 
• “We are very quality-oriented, 
very content-oriented. For the 
members of our firm it is very 
important what they do. It is not 
as sales-oriented as in other 
firms, it comes more from the 
inside.” (CEO) 
• “We adhere to our basic 
principles. […] We confidently 
state what we believe is right 
and we have the heart to enter 
new paths.” (publically 
available document). 
• “When new markets are 
opening, then we have to 
evaluate whether and how we 
[as shapers] fit in.” (manager) 
problems that are all solvable. 
What is challenging is that we 
want to use the new media to 
provide really new forms of 
content [and thus continue to be 
someone that advances the 
world].” (manager) 
• “Just producing electronic books 
[i.e. converted from print books] 
would be a disappointing signal.” 
(manager) 
games, e-learning, online books 
(for tablets and smartphones), 
interactive books (author and 
reader interact already during 
development process), video 
training, apps; all supported by 
several changes in the 
organization: “We 
experimented quite a lot.” 
(CEO; supported by press 
releases) 
• Sophisticated pricing model for 
interactive online content (since 
ca. 2011). 
• Experience with new media as 
important hiring criteria 
(production manager).  
• Large number of electronic 
products (as compared to 
number of print products). 
 
 
